Description

IBM Netezza Software 11.3.0.3 through Interim Fix 002 has operations that are performed without validating bucket ownership using the ExpectedBucketOwner parameter. This omission may allow a remote attacker to exploit misconfigurations or naming collisions to redirect application requests to an unintended S3 bucket under their control.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-03T21:17:24.797Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-03T21:17:24.797Z",
  "executiveSummary": "IBM Netezza Software versions 11.3.0.3 through Interim Fix 002 contain a vulnerability involving improper validation of S3 bucket ownership. The flaw resides in the handling of operations involving Amazon S3 storage integration, where the application fails to utilize the ExpectedBucketOwner parameter. This omission allows for potential bucket hijacking or redirection of data traffic to unauthorized endpoints. A remote, unauthenticated, or authenticated attacker could exploit naming collisions or existing misconfigurations to divert sensitive data streams to an S3 bucket under their control. The impact involves potential data exfiltration, loss of data integrity, and unauthorized interception of outbound communications. The vulnerability necessitates immediate attention to ensure that cloud-based object storage interactions are strictly validated against intended ownership IDs to prevent data transit interception.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from a deficiency in the logic governing external cloud object store interactions within the IBM Netezza software stack. Specifically, the implementation fails to enforce the ExpectedBucketOwner check during S3-compatible storage request operations. In standard secure implementations of the AWS S3 API, the ExpectedBucketOwner parameter serves as a security control to prevent unauthorized access to buckets that may share a similar or identical name but reside within a different, potentially malicious, AWS account. By omitting this validation, the application assumes that any bucket resolving to the configured name belongs to the intended service provider.\nThe attack flow relies on the ability of an attacker to facilitate a naming collision. In environments where bucket naming conventions are predictable or publicly discoverable, an attacker can create an S3 bucket with the exact name targeted by the Netezza instance in an AWS account under their control. When the vulnerable Netezza software attempts to perform a read or write operation to its configured S3 bucket, it does not verify that the target bucket is owned by the legitimate organization's AWS account. Consequently, the S3 request is successfully processed by the attacker's bucket instead of the intended enterprise bucket.\nThis vulnerability is classified as a logic flaw in the application's communication layer. Exploitation does not necessarily require deep internal system compromise but rather the manipulation of environmental or DNS-level configurations. Once the redirection is successful, the attacker can intercept sensitive data payloads, perform unauthorized write operations, or inject malicious content that the Netezza system might process. The scope of impact is highly dependent on the sensitivity of the data being transmitted to the S3 bucket, including system backups, logs, or analytical data sets. The vulnerability affects all versions of IBM Netezza Software from 11.3.0.3 through Interim Fix 002, and it represents a significant risk to data privacy and supply chain security when integrating Netezza with public cloud object storage."
}