Description

IBM Netezza Software 11.3.0.3 through Interim Fix 002 could allow an unauthorized user to inject data into log messages due to improper neutralization of special elements when written to log files.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-03T21:17:24.560Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-03T21:17:24.560Z",
  "executiveSummary": "IBM Netezza Software versions 11.3.0.3 through Interim Fix 002 are susceptible to a log injection vulnerability resulting from the improper neutralization of special elements within data processed for log output.\nThis vulnerability allows an unauthorized user to manipulate system logs by injecting arbitrary data into log files.\nThe risk is characterized by the potential for log integrity compromise, which can mislead administrative auditing, facilitate the obfuscation of malicious activities, or potentially trigger downstream issues in log analysis tools that interpret the malformed log entries.\nThe vulnerability requires that an attacker has the ability to provide input that the application subsequently writes to its log files without sanitization.\nThis represents a failure in input validation where user-supplied content is treated as trusted data during the logging process, thereby undermining the reliability of the system's forensic audit trails.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from the application's failure to perform adequate input sanitization or output encoding on data before it is committed to log files.\nIn IBM Netezza Software, specific software components responsible for logging operations do not properly neutralize special elements—such as carriage returns, line feeds, or control characters—contained within user-supplied input.\nAn attacker can exploit this by injecting crafted payloads into fields or parameters that are subsequently logged by the system. By inserting newline characters (e.g., %0A, %0D) or other structural delimiters, an attacker can forge log entries.\nThe attack flow begins when an attacker provides malicious input through a user-controlled interface or API endpoint that is logged by the Netezza environment. Upon receipt, the application processes this input and writes it directly to the system log files or internal diagnostic buffers without stripping or escaping the injected control sequences.\nThe primary mechanism of exploitation involves manipulating the log structure so that the injected data appears as a new, legitimate log entry or obscures existing log entries. For example, an attacker could craft a payload that closes the current log line and begins a new line, effectively inserting fake log messages that mimic system warnings, authentication events, or other administrative activities.\nThis behavior can lead to significant post-exploitation impact, particularly in environments where security operations centers or automated log-parsing utilities (such as SIEM platforms) rely on the integrity of these files to identify security incidents or performance issues.\nBy successfully injecting fabricated log data, an attacker can mislead administrators during incident response or perform 'log scrubbing' by burying evidence of actual malicious activity under a flood of artificial entries.\nBecause the logging process does not validate the integrity of the data stream prior to file system commit, the vulnerability persists across all affected versions (11.3.0.3 through Interim Fix 002). There is no requirement for high-level administrative privileges for the injection itself, provided the attacker has access to a service that writes to the logs."
}