Description

Pake turns a website into a desktop application built on Tauri. Every application it generates inherits two settings from the upstream template, and together they hand native functionality to untrusted web content. The first is in src-tauri/capabilities/default.json, which grants IPC access with "remote": { "urls": ["https://*.*"] }. That wildcard tells Tauri to accept IPC from any HTTPS origin, not just the site the application was built to wrap. The second is "withGlobalTauri": true in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json, which puts window.__TAURI__.core.invoke() in reach of ordinary page JavaScript. Tauri's access control list only checks plugin commands, the ones prefixed with plugin:. Commands the application registers itself through generate_handler!, known as app commands, are never checked against the ACL. So once an origin holds IPC access, it can call every app command with nothing else standing in the way. Pake registers download_file as an app command, and it does not appear in the permissions list because it does not need to. The practical effect is that any script running on any HTTPS page inside a Pake application can invoke the application's native commands. That includes third-party script the wrapped site loads on its own, such as analytics, advertising, or a compromised CDN. Anyone distributing their own Pake application gets the same access without asking for it. Chained with the path traversal in download_file that is tracked separately as CVE-2026-82635, this reaches arbitrary file write and persistent code execution.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.2",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-23T10:17:09.070Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-23T10:17:09.070Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The Pake framework, which facilitates the creation of desktop applications from websites using Tauri, contains a critical security misconfiguration related to Inter-Process Communication (IPC) permissions.\nBy default, Pake generates applications with overly permissive IPC settings that grant native capability access to any HTTPS-loaded web content, including third-party scripts like analytics or advertising trackers.\nThe vulnerability stems from an insecure wildcard configuration in src-tauri/capabilities/default.json and the enablement of the global Tauri core object, bypassing Tauri’s intended Access Control List (ACL) mechanisms.\nThis allows untrusted web content to execute registered application commands, such as 'download_file', without restriction.\nWhen combined with additional vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-82635, this flaw facilitates arbitrary file write and persistent code execution on the host system.\nThe risk is severe as it affects any application generated via Pake that inherits these default templates, granting attackers a bridge from remote web contexts to the underlying operating system.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is rooted in two specific configuration defaults within the Pake template used for Tauri application generation: the definition of IPC scope and the global availability of the Tauri core API.\nIn src-tauri/capabilities/default.json, the 'remote' setting is configured with 'urls': ['https://*.*']. This wildcard allows any HTTPS origin to establish IPC communication, effectively negating the 'Same-Origin' security boundaries intended for the wrapped application.\nSimultaneously, the 'withGlobalTauri': true setting in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json injects the 'window.__TAURI__.core.invoke()' function into the global JavaScript namespace. This allows any script executing within the web view to trigger native commands directly.\nTauri’s ACL enforcement mechanism is limited to commands prefixed with 'plugin:'. However, Pake registers its functionality, specifically the 'download_file' function, as an 'app command' via 'generate_handler!'. Because these app commands bypass the ACL check, they are exposed to any origin granted IPC access by the configuration.\nThe attack flow begins when a user loads a target website within the Pake-generated application. If the website loads third-party JavaScript—such as a compromised CDN, an ad network, or a malicious script—that script can invoke 'window.__TAURI__.core.invoke('download_file', { ... })'.\nBecause the 'download_file' function lacks input validation or origin verification, the attacker can leverage the underlying path traversal vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-82635 to write malicious files to arbitrary locations on the host filesystem.\nBy overwriting startup files, configuration files, or other sensitive system binaries, the attacker achieves persistent code execution in the context of the user running the Pake application.\nThe attack requires no authentication or specific user interaction beyond browsing to a web page, and it does not require prior knowledge of the application's internal structure beyond the existence of the 'download_file' command.\nThis vulnerability effectively escalates a cross-site scripting (XSS) or third-party dependency compromise on a hosted website into a full desktop application compromise."
}