Description

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in ThemeREX Group Camelia camelia allows Object Injection.This issue affects Camelia: from n/a through 1.2.15.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-10T08:17:06.930Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-10T08:17:06.930Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The ThemeREX Group Camelia theme (versions n/a through 1.2.15) contains a critical deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability.\nThis flaw allows for PHP Object Injection, which can lead to remote code execution (RCE), arbitrary file deletion, or denial of service, depending on the available gadget chain within the application environment.\nThe vulnerability originates from the insecure handling of user-supplied data that is passed into a deserialization function without sufficient validation or sanitization.\nSuccessful exploitation requires the attacker to submit a crafted serialized payload to an endpoint that processes the input via the vulnerable function.\nImpact is significant, as it grants attackers the ability to manipulate application logic by instantiating arbitrary objects or invoking magic methods (e.g., __wakeup, __destruct) defined in the codebase or loaded plugins.\nNo specific authentication requirements are inherently mandated for the exploitation of deserialization flaws if the vulnerable entry point is exposed to unauthenticated users; however, exploitability depends on the presence of accessible endpoints accepting serialized input.\nSecurity teams must prioritize patching or isolating vulnerable instances to prevent unauthorized code execution and complete system compromise.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the insecure deserialization process where the Camelia theme improperly processes user-provided input, likely via the PHP unserialize() function.\nDeserialization occurs when a web application converts a serialized string back into a PHP object. If the input source is untrusted and lacks integrity checks, an attacker can supply a custom serialized object string that alters the application's state.\nThe exploit flow begins when an attacker identifies an endpoint or parameter that consumes serialized data. The attacker crafts a malicious serialized string containing class names present in the application's current include path.\nBy manipulating the object properties, the attacker triggers unintended behavior when the PHP engine automatically invokes magic methods such as __wakeup(), __destruct(), or __toString() on the injected object.\nIf the environment contains 'gadget chains'—a sequence of class methods that can be linked to perform unauthorized actions—an attacker can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE). For example, if a gadget chain exists that performs file operations, the attacker can leverage the deserialization to write or delete arbitrary files on the server filesystem.\nThe affected versions, spanning from the initial release through 1.2.15, demonstrate that the theme lacks a robust mechanism to verify the origin or structure of the serialized data before processing.\nBecause PHP's unserialize() allows the creation of objects of any existing class, the attacker is not limited to the methods intended by the developer. They can leverage any class loaded in the global scope of the WordPress environment, including those from other installed plugins or core WordPress components.\nThe primary risk is that once the object is reconstructed, the attacker-controlled properties define the execution flow during the lifecycle of the object, effectively bypassing traditional input sanitization filters that only check for malicious characters rather than malicious object structure.\nPost-exploitation, the attacker can gain persistent access, exfiltrate sensitive data stored in the database, or deploy a webshell to maintain control over the server environment, leading to full compromise of the underlying host."
}