Description

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in ThemeREX Group Greeny greeny allows Object Injection.This issue affects Greeny: from n/a through 2.10.0.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-10T08:17:06.433Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-10T08:17:06.433Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The Greeny theme by ThemeREX, spanning versions from n/a through 2.10.0, is susceptible to a Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability.\nThis security flaw facilitates PHP Object Injection, a critical vulnerability class that occurs when user-supplied input is passed to an unsafe deserialization function without adequate validation or sanitization.\nSuccessful exploitation allows an unauthenticated or authenticated attacker—depending on the specific entry point—to inject malicious serialized objects into the application environment.\nThe primary impact includes Remote Code Execution (RCE), unauthorized file manipulation, or denial-of-service, depending on the available gadget chains present in the application's codebase or included libraries.\nThe risk is categorized as high, as it enables full compromise of the affected WordPress site, potentially leading to complete data exfiltration, backdooring, or server takeover.\nRemediation requires rigorous input validation and the replacement of dangerous deserialization functions with safer alternatives like JSON-based data handling.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the improper handling of serialized PHP data within the ThemeREX Greeny theme. When the application receives serialized data from an untrusted source and processes it using functions such as unserialize(), it creates an environment ripe for Object Injection.\nThe root cause is the lack of strict type checking or input filtering before the unserialize() function is invoked. By providing a crafted serialized string, an attacker can manipulate the state of existing PHP objects within the application's scope.\nThe attack flow initiates when an attacker identifies an endpoint or parameter that accepts serialized input. The attacker crafts a malicious payload containing an object of a class existing within the application or its bundled dependencies. This object is designed to trigger specific 'magic methods'—such as __wakeup(), __destruct(), or __toString()—upon the completion of the deserialization process.\nThese magic methods, when executed with attacker-controlled properties, act as 'gadgets.' If the application includes vulnerable code paths or libraries that perform dangerous operations (e.g., file_put_contents(), system(), or eval()) based on the object's properties, the attacker can hijack the control flow of the execution.\nIn the context of the Greeny theme, this could allow an attacker to bypass authentication, overwrite configuration files, or execute arbitrary code under the privileges of the web server process. The exploit does not necessarily require direct interaction with the underlying database; rather, it exploits the logic of the application's object memory management.\nAffected versions include all iterations from the inception of the product through 2.10.0. The vulnerability is typically exposed via HTTP POST or GET parameters that are passed into backend theme functions responsible for session handling, configuration restoration, or data persistence. Given that WordPress themes often include external libraries, the attack surface may be extended by the presence of third-party gadget chains that assist in escalating simple object injection into full Remote Code Execution (RCE).\nPost-exploitation impact is severe, as the integrity and availability of the WordPress environment are compromised. Attackers often leverage this access to establish persistence, deploy web shells, or pivot to internal network segments if the host is misconfigured."
}