Description

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in ThemeREX Group Let's Play playhockey allows Object Injection.This issue affects Let's Play: from n/a through 1.1.15.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-10T08:17:05.933Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-10T08:17:05.933Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The Let's Play plugin by ThemeREX Group is susceptible to an Object Injection vulnerability resulting from the insecure deserialization of untrusted data.\nThis vulnerability exists in versions ranging from n/a through 1.1.15.\nThe flaw allows an unauthenticated or authenticated attacker to inject malicious serialized objects into the application, which are subsequently unserialized by the plugin.\nSuccessful exploitation can lead to severe security compromises, including arbitrary code execution (ACE), remote code execution (RCE), or unauthorized data access, depending on the available gadget chains present within the application's environment.\nThe vulnerability poses a significant risk to the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of the host WordPress installation.\nAttackers can leverage this flaw to execute arbitrary PHP functions or manipulate object states to bypass security controls, effectively gaining control over the affected site without requiring elevated privileges.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is rooted in the improper handling of user-supplied input that is passed to PHP's unserialize() function without sufficient validation or integrity checks.\nObject Injection occurs when untrusted data is processed by deserialization functions, allowing an attacker to instantiate objects of arbitrary classes present in the application's scope.\nIn the context of the Let's Play plugin, the application accepts serialized data through user-controllable input vectors, such as HTTP request parameters or cookies. When the plugin processes this input, it reconstructs the object state using the provided input string. If the application environment contains 'gadget chains'—specifically, classes with magic methods like __destruct(), __wakeup(), or __toString()—an attacker can craft a malicious serialized payload to trigger these methods upon destruction or interaction.\nThe attack flow typically follows these steps: 1. Identification: The attacker identifies an input field that the plugin processes via unserialize(). 2. Payload Crafting: The attacker creates a serialized object payload, often utilizing existing classes in the WordPress core or other installed themes/plugins that perform sensitive operations (e.g., file deletion, database queries, or command execution) within their magic methods. 3. Injection: The attacker submits the crafted payload to the vulnerable endpoint. 4. Execution: The application unserializes the malicious object. As the object is instantiated or destroyed, the associated magic methods are executed, causing the arbitrary code or logic within the gadget chain to run with the privileges of the web server user.\nThis vulnerability is particularly critical because it bypasses standard input sanitization by targeting the structural logic of the application rather than the input content itself. The exploitation does not require the attacker to inject new code directly but rather to repurpose existing code in ways unintended by the developers. The post-exploitation impact includes the potential for full server compromise, persistent backdoor placement, or the modification of site data. The flaw affects all versions of the Let's Play plugin through 1.1.15, and because it resides in the deserialization logic, the attack is typically reachable over the network without requiring prior authentication, depending on the specific endpoint exposed by the plugin."
}