Description

A component of one of the Motorola system applications was exported without permission, allowing for the revocation of runtime permissions from other apps.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "4.4",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-01T20:17:32.867Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-01T20:17:32.867Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves an improper component export within a Motorola system application, constituting an insecure Android Intent configuration. The flaw allows unauthorized entities to invoke sensitive functionality, specifically the revocation of runtime permissions from third-party applications. By exposing a component that lacks sufficient permission enforcement or intent-filter restrictions, the system permits malicious local applications to perform unauthorized security state modifications. The impact is significant, as an attacker can systematically strip legitimate applications of their granted runtime permissions, leading to application instability, loss of functionality, or denial-of-service conditions. This exploit requires local access to the device and leverages the Android inter-process communication (IPC) mechanism to bypass security boundaries. The risk is classified as a privilege management flaw, enabling a low-privileged application to manipulate the permission state of other installed software packages without user interaction or system prompts.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in an improper configuration of the AndroidManifest.xml file for a Motorola-specific system component. Specifically, a component (such as an Activity, Service, or BroadcastReceiver) was declared with the 'android:exported=true' attribute without the implementation of corresponding 'android:permission' enforcement. In the Android security model, marking a component as exported allows any other application installed on the same device to trigger its intent filters. Because the component handles sensitive logic regarding the system's PermissionManagerService or related permission policy management, the failure to restrict access via a signature-level permission creates a local escalation path.\nThe exploitation flow proceeds as follows: First, an attacker develops a malicious application designed to craft and dispatch an Intent specifically targeting the exposed Motorola system component. The attacker identifies the target package name and component name through static analysis of the Motorola firmware or system image. Once identified, the attacker utilizes the 'startActivity()' or 'sendBroadcast()' methods to invoke the component, passing a payload that includes the necessary extras to trigger the permission revocation logic. Since the component is exported and lacks signature-level protection, the Android system facilitates the IPC call, allowing the attacker’s process to interact directly with the privileged system logic.\nUpon execution, the vulnerable component processes the intent, which likely calls internal APIs within the framework to update the AppOps or PermissionManager settings for a victim application. The component, trusting the caller because it was invoked via internal system protocols, executes the command to revoke runtime permissions (e.g., location, camera, or storage access) from the targeted package. Because this occurs via a legitimate system component, the security manager perceives the request as an authorized administrative action. Post-exploitation, the victim application suffers from degraded service or complete failure, as it no longer possesses the necessary grants to perform its duties. This mechanism bypasses the standard 'Settings' UI gatekeeping, allowing for silent, mass revocation of permissions across the device's ecosystem, effectively neutralizing the security posture of third-party applications without the user's consent or knowledge."
}