Description

Huly Platform through 0.7.426 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the print service due to missing hostname allowlist validation. Authenticated workspace members can supply arbitrary URLs to the print endpoint, which Puppeteer renders and returns as downloadable PDFs or images, enabling access to internal metadata services and network hosts.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-14T18:20:29.583Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-14T18:20:29.583Z",
  "executiveSummary": "Huly Platform, up to version 0.7.426, contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within its print service component. The flaw arises from a failure to implement proper hostname allowlisting during the URL processing phase.\nThis vulnerability allows authenticated workspace members to force the server to initiate arbitrary network requests to internal or external resources. By supplying a malicious URL to the print endpoint, an attacker can leverage the application's Puppeteer-based rendering engine to exfiltrate data from internal metadata services or probe restricted network hosts that are otherwise inaccessible from the public internet.\nThe risk implication is significant, as it grants authenticated users the capability to perform reconnaissance on internal infrastructure and potentially access sensitive cloud metadata services (e.g., AWS/GCP instance metadata endpoints). Exploitation is contingent upon the attacker having valid workspace credentials, which simplifies the attack path for malicious insiders or compromised user accounts.\nDefensive measures must focus on implementing strict server-side request validation and network-level isolation of the rendering service to prevent unauthorized interactions with internal infrastructure.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the print service module of the Huly Platform, specifically in the input validation logic handling URL parameters passed to the Puppeteer-based browser automation engine. The root cause is the absence of a comprehensive hostname allowlist or blocklist, which permits the application to process and fetch content from arbitrary Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) provided by the user.\nThe attack flow begins when an authenticated workspace member interacts with the print endpoint. The user submits a malicious URL, which the application passes to the backend print service without verification. The service then instructs its Puppeteer instance to navigate to the specified destination. Because the server process executing this task likely possesses network visibility into the internal environment, the application acts as an unintended proxy for the attacker.\nSuccessful exploitation allows for a variety of SSRF-based attack vectors. The attacker can target internal loopback addresses (127.0.0.1) or internal network ranges to interact with non-public services, including databases, admin interfaces, or internal APIs that trust requests originating from the application server. Furthermore, the Puppeteer engine retrieves the contents of the target URL to render it as a PDF or image, which is subsequently returned to the attacker. This mechanism can be used to bypass traditional perimeter defenses and facilitate the exfiltration of internal data, such as configuration files, environment variables, or cloud metadata service tokens (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/).\nBecause the rendering process is performed by a headless browser, the impact is compounded by the execution of client-side scripts if the target endpoint contains malicious content, potentially leading to further exploitation of the server environment. This vulnerability affects all Huly Platform versions up to and including 0.7.426. The requirement for authentication limits the threat actor profile to authorized users, but in environments with broad user access, this still represents a critical security gap that can lead to full server-side compromise or lateral movement within the production network."
}