Description

A security flaw has been discovered in netease-youdao LobsterAI 2026.6.15/2026.8.28/2026.9.3/2026.9.4. Impacted is the function OpenClawConfigSync.buildBrowserConfig of the file src/main/libs/openclawConfigSync.ts of the component Browser Network Configuration. The manipulation results in server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The reported GitHub issue was closed automatically due to inactivity.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "4.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-14T21:17:41.987Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-14T21:17:41.987Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in the netease-youdao LobsterAI application, specifically within the Browser Network Configuration component.\nThe vulnerability resides in the OpenClawConfigSync.buildBrowserConfig function within the src/main/libs/openclawConfigSync.ts file.\nThis flaw allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to force the application to perform unauthorized requests to arbitrary internal or external resources.\nSuccessful exploitation poses significant risk, potentially enabling attackers to bypass network security controls, probe internal infrastructure, or access sensitive metadata services unreachable from the public internet.\nThe vulnerability is currently exposed through public exploit code, increasing the likelihood of active exploitation.\nAffected versions include 2026.6.15, 2026.8.28, 2026.9.3, and 2026.9.4.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is rooted in the improper validation of user-supplied input used to construct network requests within the OpenClawConfigSync.buildBrowserConfig function.\nThe affected component, responsible for the synchronization of browser configurations, fails to implement adequate sanitization or an allow-list mechanism for target URLs or destination hostnames.\nAn attacker can exploit this by manipulating the configuration parameters consumed by the buildBrowserConfig function. When the application processes these malicious configurations, it initiates outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests to destinations controlled by the attacker.\nThe attack flow begins with the delivery of a crafted payload to the affected interface. Upon processing, the server-side logic executes a request using the unsanitized input. Because the process executes in the context of the LobsterAI backend, the request originates from the internal application environment.\nThis SSRF vector allows the attacker to interact with internal-only network endpoints, such as local management interfaces, internal APIs, or cloud service metadata instances (e.g., 169.254.169.254).\nGiven that the exploit is released publicly, an attacker can leverage this primitive to perform internal network reconnaissance, conduct port scanning, or potentially extract sensitive credentials or environment data through interactions with internal services.\nThere are no authentication requirements specified for triggering this function, implying that the attack can be launched remotely by any entity capable of reaching the vulnerable endpoint.\nThe scope of impact is limited to the server-side environment where the Browser Network Configuration component operates, but it poses a substantial threat to the overall integrity of the internal network segment hosting the LobsterAI service."
}