Description

A flaw has been found in cosmicstack-labs mercury-agent up to 1.1.13. Affected by this vulnerability is the function githubRequest of the file src/utils/github.ts of the component GitHub API Handler. This manipulation of the argument path causes server-side request forgery. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been published and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-14T20:17:02.723Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-14T20:17:02.723Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the cosmicstack-labs mercury-agent component due to improper validation of user-supplied input within the GitHub API Handler.\nThe vulnerability resides in the githubRequest function located in src/utils/github.ts and affects versions up to 1.1.13.\nBy manipulating the 'path' argument, a remote, unauthenticated attacker can coerce the mercury-agent to perform unauthorized HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network resources or cloud metadata services.\nThe risk is critical, as the existence of a public exploit significantly lowers the barrier for malicious actors to conduct reconnaissance, pivot into internal environments, or exfiltrate sensitive configuration data.\nThe project maintainers have been notified, but no patches or official remediations have been issued to date.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from an insecure implementation of the githubRequest function within the mercury-agent application. The function is designed to facilitate interactions with the GitHub API; however, it fails to sufficiently sanitize or validate the 'path' argument before constructing the outgoing request.\nWhen the 'path' argument is processed, the application does not verify if the destination conforms to an expected GitHub API schema or domain restriction. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary URL paths or manipulate the request structure to point the underlying HTTP client at unintended targets.\nThe exploitation flow begins when an attacker identifies an endpoint or interface that triggers a call to githubRequest. By supplying a crafted input for the 'path' variable, the attacker alters the target host or URI parameters of the backend request. Because the server-side process executes this request on behalf of the application, the malicious request originates from the trusted server environment, effectively bypassing perimeter firewalls and network-level access controls.\nThis SSRF primitive allows for potential interaction with services bound to the localhost interface or other internal network segments that are not publicly reachable. An attacker can leverage this to perform port scanning, fingerprint internal services, or access cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254) to retrieve IAM credentials or instance metadata.\nGiven the nature of the githubRequest component, the vulnerability is remotely exploitable without requiring prior authentication. The lack of input validation and request-origin verification effectively converts the component into an open proxy for malicious traffic. Post-exploitation impact ranges from information disclosure of internal configuration files and sensitive environment variables to full compromise of the underlying host if exposed services are vulnerable to additional, secondary exploits."
}