Description

A vulnerability was identified in HKUDS nanobot up to 0.2.1. The affected element is the function ExecTool._guard_command/ExecTool._spawn of the file nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py of the component ExecTool. Such manipulation leads to argument injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The name of the patch is af582246f141311d574551b7571a517bcc3df750. It is best practice to apply a patch to resolve this issue.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-14T19:18:11.290Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-14T19:18:11.290Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical argument injection vulnerability has been identified in HKUDS nanobot versions up to 0.2.1, specifically residing within the ExecTool component.\nThe flaw stems from improper sanitization of inputs processed by the ExecTool._guard_command and ExecTool._spawn functions within nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py.\nThis vulnerability enables remote attackers to inject arbitrary arguments into command-line executions initiated by the agent.\nSuccessful exploitation permits unauthorized command execution, potentially leading to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or unauthorized control over the agent's host environment.\nThe risk is elevated due to the potential for remote exploitation, necessitating immediate remediation to prevent malicious actors from manipulating the shell interface.\nNo specific authentication is mentioned as a prerequisite for this remote attack vector, emphasizing the severity of the flaw within exposed deployments.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is classified as an argument injection flaw located in the nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py file, impacting the ExecTool class. The root cause lies in the unsafe construction of shell commands within the _guard_command and _spawn methods.\nIn the affected versions, these functions fail to sufficiently validate or escape user-supplied inputs before passing them to the underlying system shell or sub-process execution environment. Because the tool interprets input strings directly, an attacker can supply crafted input containing shell-specific metacharacters or flag sequences to modify the intended command structure.\nThe attack flow initiates when an attacker provides malicious parameters to the agent. When the agent invokes ExecTool, the _guard_command logic is bypassed or improperly evaluates the input, allowing the _spawn method to execute a command with unintended arguments. By injecting flags (e.g., --help, --option, or redirection operators), an attacker can alter the behavior of the targeted utility or escape the intended execution sandbox.\nFor example, if the agent intended to run 'ls [user_input]', an attacker might supply input such as 'dummy_file; command_to_execute'. If the application does not properly enforce parameter isolation, the system shell interprets the injected string as a secondary command or a sequence of malicious arguments, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE).\nThe impact is significant, as it grants the attacker the ability to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the nanobot agent process. This facilitates lateral movement within the network, access to sensitive configuration files, or the installation of persistent backdoors on the host machine.\nThe vulnerability is remediated by the patch identified by hash af582246f141311d574551b7571a517bcc3df750, which addresses the improper command construction logic in the specified functions. Exploitation does not require prior local access, as the remote nature of the agent's input processing allows for external triggering of the vulnerable code paths."
}