Description

AVideo through commit c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 fails to validate ad impressions in plugin/AD_Server/log.php, allowing logged-in users to submit arbitrary label values that trigger unverified wallet credits to campaign video owners. Attackers can repeatedly POST label=start requests to mint YPTWallet balance for any campaign video without proof an ad actually played.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-11T12:16:55.223Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-11T12:16:55.223Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The AVideo platform, specifically within the AD_Server plugin, contains a critical logical vulnerability that permits the unauthorized inflation of digital currency balances. The flaw resides in plugin/AD_Server/log.php and stems from a lack of server-side validation regarding ad impression legitimacy. An authenticated user can trigger a POST request with arbitrary label parameters, resulting in unverified wallet credits being minted to campaign video owners.\nThis vulnerability constitutes an Insecure Direct Object Reference or an Improper Authorization flaw, allowing for the manipulation of financial accounting within the application. The impact is significant, as it enables the systemic abuse of the YPTWallet system, leading to unauthorized balance generation without corresponding ad performance proof. Any authenticated user possesses the capability to exploit this, requiring no advanced privileges other than standard account access. The risk profile is high, as the exploitation is trivial to automate, potentially leading to widespread financial imbalance and service-wide economic instability within the AVideo ecosystem.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is the absence of rigorous server-side verification in the plugin/AD_Server/log.php file. The application is designed to reward video owners for advertisement impressions; however, the mechanism responsible for recording these events fails to validate the state or authenticity of the ad playback event. Specifically, the script accepts a label parameter via an HTTP POST request which is used to process credits to the YPTWallet account associated with the target video campaign.\nThe exploitation flow begins with an authenticated attacker identifying a campaign video ID. Once targeted, the attacker initiates a series of crafted HTTP POST requests to plugin/AD_Server/log.php. By setting the label parameter to 'start' or other accepted triggers, the backend logic executes the credit-minting function associated with the AD_Server plugin. Because the server does not verify if the ad was truly served, rendered, or interacted with by a client-side player, it relies entirely on the client-supplied request as the source of truth.\nThis design flaw allows for 'replay' or 'forgery' attacks, where an attacker can programmatically iterate these requests thousands of times, effectively minting arbitrary amounts of YPTWallet credits. Since the application logic assumes that any request to this endpoint signifies a legitimate impression, it automatically updates the user's wallet balance in the underlying database without conducting integrity checks against ad-server logs or time-based rate limiting.\nThe vulnerability affects AVideo through commit c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1. The scope of impact is limited to authenticated users who have access to the platform; however, given that many video platforms allow public registration, the network exposure is effectively public. Post-exploitation impact includes the full compromise of the YPTWallet balance integrity, allowing malicious actors to drain platform resources or gain an unfair economic advantage within the AVideo ecosystem. There is no requirement for interaction with the video player itself, as the exploitation bypasses the UI/UX layer entirely by targeting the logging endpoint directly."
}