Description

On ARM platforms, a vulnerability in the architecture design of HDD Password could allow an attacker to retrieve HDD Password from UEFI variables.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.9",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-19T06:17:43.293Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-19T06:17:43.293Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves an architectural design flaw affecting HDD Password security mechanisms on ARM platforms. The core issue permits unauthorized retrieval of sensitive Hard Disk Drive (HDD) passwords stored within UEFI variables. This information disclosure flaw introduces significant risk to data confidentiality, as leaked HDD passwords can compromise full-disk encryption or hardware-level storage security controls.\nThe vulnerability stems from improper isolation or access control enforcement at the architectural level within UEFI variable storage implementations on ARM-based systems. An attacker with appropriate local access or execution capabilities within the pre-boot or OS environment—depending on UEFI runtime service permissions—could leverage this architectural weakness to query and extract sensitive credentials without authorization.\nWhile the specific exploitation requirements and privilege thresholds depend on the precise firmware implementation, the underlying design vulnerability bypasses the intended confidentiality boundaries protecting hardware-associated authentication secrets. Risk implications include unauthorized access to encrypted storage devices, potential persistence mechanisms, and compromise of sensitive data at rest across vulnerable ARM hardware platforms.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the architectural design of the HDD Password feature within UEFI implementations on ARM platforms. Hard Disk Drive passwords are conventionally utilized to secure access to storage devices by locking the drive via ATA or NVMe security protocols, with firmware often caching or storing necessary authentication parameters within non-volatile UEFI variables for pre-boot authentication workflows.\nThe root cause is an insufficient access control model and lack of strict cryptographic isolation for sensitive UEFI variables associated with hardware security features. In standard UEFI architectures, variables containing sensitive operational data should be protected by attributes such as EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE, EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS, and crucially EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, restricting or entirely preventing unauthorized read operations from untrusted execution contexts.\nOn the affected ARM platforms, the architectural design fails to adequately restrict read access to these specific UEFI variables. Consequently, software executing with standard operating system privileges or within accessible runtime environments can invoke standard UEFI runtime services, such as GetVariable(), to query the memory space where the HDD Password variables are stored.\nThe step-by-step attack flow typically proceeds as follows: First, an attacker establishes execution capability on the host operating system or leverages a localized execution vector. Second, the attacker interacts with the UEFI runtime services interface exposed by the operating system kernel or directly interfaces with physical/virtualized memory structures where UEFI variables are mapped. Third, the attacker issues a GetVariable query targeting the specific GUID and variable name associated with the cached or stored HDD Password. Fourth, due to the architectural design flaw, the firmware returns the plaintext or weakly protected password data without enforcing strict authentication or privilege validation.\nPost-exploitation impact includes the recovery of valid credentials capable of unlocking encrypted storage media across current or subsequent boots. This undermines the hardware-backed security trust chain, allowing unauthorized entities to bypass storage-level protections, read proprietary or user data, and potentially manipulate boot configurations or firmware storage assets depending on subsequent privilege escalation opportunities."
}