Description

Incorrect privilege assignment in Temporary Elevated Access Management (TEAM) for AWS IAM Identity Center solution before version 1.5.1 might allow an authenticated remote user with application-level access to read, approve, modify, or revoke arbitrary access requests, thereby obtaining unintended temporary elevated access to the AWS accounts accessed using the TEAM deployment. This issue has been addressed in TEAM version 1.5.1 or later. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.2",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-14T19:17:52.523Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-14T19:17:52.523Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The Temporary Elevated Access Management (TEAM) for AWS IAM Identity Center solution contains a critical vulnerability regarding improper privilege assignment. This flaw resides in the application's access control logic, specifically affecting versions prior to 1.5.1.\nAn authenticated remote user possessing basic application-level access can bypass intended authorization constraints to perform unauthorized administrative actions. By exploiting this flaw, an attacker can manipulate access requests—including reading, modifying, approving, or revoking them—effectively escalating their own privileges or those of other users within the environment.\nThe impact includes the potential for unauthorized temporary elevated access to AWS accounts managed by the TEAM deployment. This represents a significant security risk, as it allows for unauthorized persistence or privilege escalation within the cloud infrastructure. The vulnerability requires the attacker to have existing application-level access, meaning the scope of exploitation is limited to entities already authenticated to the TEAM platform but lacking the appropriate permissions for administrative tasks. Remediation requires an immediate upgrade to version 1.5.1 or later to implement the corrected access control mechanisms.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability in the Temporary Elevated Access Management (TEAM) solution is rooted in flawed authorization checks during the processing of access requests. The application fails to properly enforce ownership or permission validation when handling internal request objects via the management interface.\nSpecifically, the root cause appears to be an insufficient server-side validation of the user's principal identity against the metadata associated with the target access request. In affected versions prior to 1.5.1, the application logic does not strictly verify that a user possesses the requisite administrative role or ownership before permitting modifications to the state of an access request.\nThe attack flow begins when an authenticated remote user interacts with the TEAM application's backend API or web interface. A user with standard, non-administrative privileges can craft or intercept requests to the API endpoints responsible for updating or approving access claims. Because the system lacks a secondary authorization layer to ensure that the session identity matches the permitted requester or an authorized administrator, the backend service processes the request as legitimate.\nAn attacker can exploit this by manipulating request parameters within the HTTP payload. By altering fields associated with access request IDs, an attacker can target arbitrary requests—including those they did not initiate. This allows the attacker to approve pending access requests for themselves or modify existing requests to grant expanded durations or different permission sets.\nThe scope of this vulnerability allows for full lifecycle control over elevated access tokens. An attacker can perform the following actions: 1) Read sensitive request metadata to identify targets. 2) Modify request parameters to change access duration or permission levels. 3) Approve unauthorized access requests, triggering the provision of temporary AWS credentials. 4) Revoke legitimate access requests to disrupt security operations or deny service to other authorized administrators.\nPost-exploitation impact involves the acquisition of temporary elevated access to the target AWS accounts. Because the TEAM solution is designed to manage and provision such access, the successful manipulation of its internal state directly results in the unauthorized assignment of IAM roles or policy permissions. This bypasses the intended 'Just-in-Time' (JIT) access governance model, potentially leading to unauthorized data access, resource modification, or configuration changes within the underlying AWS environment. The vulnerability effectively allows a lower-privileged authenticated user to assume administrative control over the TEAM workflow."
}