Description

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 contain a broken access control vulnerability in AssetModelPolicy where the files() method cascades from assets.files permission, allowing authenticated users to upload and delete file attachments on Asset Model records without the required models.files permission. Attackers with only assets.files permission can mutate shared model file attachments across company boundaries and bypass the dedicated models.files permission intended to restrict file management on the shared Asset Model catalog.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-09T14:17:28.363Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-09T14:17:28.363Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves a broken access control flaw within the Snipe-IT AssetModelPolicy, specifically affecting versions prior to 8.7.0. The vulnerability allows authenticated users to perform unauthorized file operations on Asset Model records, bypassing intended permission restrictions.\nThe root cause resides in an improper permission cascade where the files() method in AssetModelPolicy incorrectly inherits permissions from assets.files rather than enforcing the required models.files permission. This enables users assigned only the assets.files privilege to upload, modify, or delete file attachments associated with Asset Models.\nThe risk implications are significant, as this defect allows unauthorized actors to mutate shared model file attachments, potentially leading to data manipulation, unauthorized content injection, or the deletion of critical documentation across company boundaries. Exploitation requires an authenticated session with the assets.files permission, but bypasses the granular security controls designed to segregate management of the shared Asset Model catalog. This flaw undermines the integrity of the asset management system and violates the principle of least privilege.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is localized within the AssetModelPolicy component of the Snipe-IT application. The security oversight occurs within the files() method, which is responsible for mediating authorization for file operations on Asset Models. Instead of strictly validating that the requesting user possesses the models.files permission—which is the designated granular control for asset model file management—the policy logic improperly cascades, or fails to override, the authorization check from the assets.files permission.\nThis behavior creates an authorization mismatch where a less restrictive permission grants elevated capabilities. An attacker possessing only the assets.files permission, which is intended for operations on individual assets, is granted unauthorized access to the shared catalog of Asset Models. The exploitation flow begins with the authenticated user interacting with the asset model file management endpoints. When the application invokes the AssetModelPolicy::files() method to verify if the current user is authorized to perform upload, update, or deletion tasks, the function incorrectly validates against the user's possession of the assets.files privilege.\nBecause the application logic fails to isolate the scope of these two distinct permissions, the user successfully bypasses the intended restriction. An attacker can upload malicious attachments, overwrite existing file records, or delete files associated with models they should not have administrative control over. Since Asset Models are shared entities within the platform, this capability allows a user to impact the global file catalog, effectively crossing company boundaries and compromising the integrity of the shared resource pool. The flaw persists in all versions of Snipe-IT prior to 8.7.0. The vulnerability is entirely server-side and does not require complex client-side manipulation, relying solely on the misuse of existing API endpoints or administrative web interfaces that rely on the flawed Policy class to govern access. Post-exploitation impact includes the potential for persistent XSS via malicious file uploads, the destruction of asset documentation, or the unauthorized modification of model-related metadata stored within attached files."
}