Description

electerm before 5.3.15 exposes 40+ main-process functions through an unvalidated Electron IPC handler with no function-name allowlist or sender validation. Renderer-side script execution can invoke openFileWithEditor and other functions with arbitrary arguments to execute system commands in the main process.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.4",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-08T12:16:59.840Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-08T12:16:59.840Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The vulnerability identified in electerm versions prior to 5.3.15 is a critical improper input validation flaw affecting the Electron Inter-Process Communication (IPC) architecture.\nThe defect arises from the exposure of over 40 main-process functions via an IPC handler that lacks a function-name allowlist or origin validation.\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker capable of executing scripts within the renderer process to invoke sensitive internal functions with arbitrary arguments.\nThe primary risk implication is Remote Code Execution (RCE), as the attacker can manipulate high-privileged main-process functions, such as 'openFileWithEditor', to execute arbitrary system commands.\nThe attack is context-dependent, requiring the ability to execute JavaScript in the renderer process (e.g., via XSS or compromised third-party dependencies).\nGiven that the main process runs with the privileges of the user executing the application, successful exploitation grants the attacker full control over the local environment, bypassing standard sandboxing protections.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is the insecure implementation of the Electron IPC mechanism within electerm. Electron applications utilize IPC to facilitate communication between the isolated renderer process (UI layer) and the privileged main process (Node.js backend). The vulnerability occurs because the IPC handler acts as an insecure bridge, indiscriminately exposing internal functionality to the renderer.\nSpecifically, the application fails to implement a whitelist or an allowlist mechanism to restrict which functions are accessible via the IPC channel. Furthermore, it lacks validation of the 'sender' of the IPC message, meaning any context originating from the renderer can invoke any function mapped to this handler.\nThe exploitation flow is as follows: An attacker leverages a secondary vulnerability (such as a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability or malicious dependency injection) to gain script execution capabilities within the renderer process. Once inside, the attacker crafts a malicious IPC message using the exposed handler. By targeting functions such as 'openFileWithEditor', the attacker passes arbitrary, malicious arguments that the main process treats as valid commands.\nBecause the main process operates with Node.js privileges, these arguments are executed as system-level instructions. This effectively breaks the boundary between the web-based renderer and the underlying operating system. The lack of validation ensures that the main process does not distinguish between legitimate internal calls and malicious requests, leading to arbitrary system command execution.\nThe vulnerable component is the IPC bridge logic responsible for dispatching messages between processes. Affected versions include all releases of electerm prior to 5.3.15. This vulnerability does not require authentication from the attacker's perspective, as the exploit is triggered from within the application's own context. No specific network exposure is required beyond the initial execution of the compromised renderer script. Post-exploitation impact is severe, allowing for complete system compromise, data exfiltration, or the installation of persistent malicious software on the host machine."
}