Description

In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.2.2 missing project-trust confirmation before building a Dev Container allowed host-level code execution

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-07T17:17:28.903Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-07T17:17:28.903Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves a missing security validation check within JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA, specifically regarding the 'project-trust' mechanism when initiating a Dev Container build process.\nThe flaw allows for arbitrary host-level code execution by bypassing the intended sandbox or confirmation prompts designed to restrict operations on untrusted projects.\nAffected versions include all releases of IntelliJ IDEA prior to 2026.2.2.\nThe risk is critical, as it grants a remote or local attacker the ability to execute code on the host machine with the permissions of the IDE user simply by inducing the user to build a malicious Dev Container configuration.\nNo complex authentication is required beyond the user interacting with the project, making this a significant vector for supply-chain or social engineering attacks targeting developers.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from a deficiency in the project-trust framework's implementation regarding the Dev Container integration. In IntelliJ IDEA, the 'Project Trust' feature acts as a security barrier, designed to prevent arbitrary code execution by requiring explicit user confirmation before the IDE performs high-risk operations—such as executing build scripts or initializing development environments—on projects that have not been explicitly marked as 'trusted.'\nIn versions prior to 2026.2.2, the Dev Container build initiation process failed to enforce this verification check. When a user opens a project containing a malicious .devcontainer directory or configuration file, the IDE's internal build automation module triggers the Dev Container lifecycle hooks without verifying the project's trust status.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: An attacker crafts a repository containing a specially manipulated Dev Container configuration (e.g., a devcontainer.json file). This configuration includes directives designed to execute shell commands during the container build phase. When the victim opens this directory in an unpatched IntelliJ IDEA instance, the IDE automatically attempts to resolve the Dev Container environment. Because the trust confirmation prompt is bypassed, the IDE proceeds to execute the build scripts defined in the configuration on the host operating system. These scripts are executed with the full user-level privileges assigned to the IDE process.\nThe vulnerability resides within the project-trust middleware that governs external environment orchestration. By neglecting to block the build process until the 'Trust Project' dialogue is accepted, the IDE inadvertently facilitates a path to Remote Code Execution (RCE). The impact is substantial: an attacker gains an immediate foothold on the developer's workstation, enabling data exfiltration, the installation of persistent backdoors, or the injection of malicious code into the developer's other local projects. Because this occurs during the build process, the execution occurs outside of the container sandbox, targeting the underlying host infrastructure directly."
}