Description

In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.2.2 opening an untrusted project could trigger SSRF via Kubernetes spec-source URL fetching

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "3.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-07T17:17:28.783Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-07T17:17:28.783Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA versions prior to 2026.2.2. This flaw is triggered when the IDE parses an untrusted project containing specific Kubernetes configuration files.\nThe vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the IDE into making unauthorized HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs via the Kubernetes spec-source URL fetching mechanism. This could potentially be leveraged to probe internal network infrastructure, bypass firewalls, or interact with metadata services if the developer is working within a cloud environment.\nThe attack is classified as client-side, requiring the target user to open a malicious or untrusted project directory. Successful exploitation enables an attacker to force the IDE process to act as a proxy, executing requests on the victim's local machine or internal network segment. The risk is elevated in environments where developers have access to sensitive internal services or cloud provider metadata endpoints, as the IDE's execution context may carry elevated network permissions.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the insecure handling of external resource references within Kubernetes configuration files during the project indexing or configuration loading phase. When IntelliJ IDEA parses a project, its Kubernetes plugin attempts to resolve and fetch specifications or schema files from external URLs to provide IDE features such as code completion, validation, and documentation rendering.\nThe attack flow begins when a malicious actor distributes a project directory containing a specifically crafted Kubernetes manifest file. Within this file, the 'spec-source' or equivalent field is configured to point to an attacker-controlled URI. When the user opens this project in an affected version of IntelliJ IDEA, the IDE's Kubernetes subsystem automatically initiates an HTTP GET request to the specified resource to validate or fetch the schema.\nThe exploitation process does not require user authentication or specialized privileges within the IDE; the mere act of opening the project triggers the background fetching mechanism. Because the request originates from the IDE process (a trusted application on the host system), it can bypass local network boundaries that would otherwise restrict direct external access to internal resources. If the attacker supplies an internal IP address or a loopback address (e.g., 127.0.0.1 or 169.254.169.254), the IDE will execute the request against those targets.\nThe vulnerability resides within the internal modules responsible for Kubernetes plugin functionality and URL resource resolution. By manipulating the remote resource target, an attacker can conduct blind SSRF to enumerate open ports on the local machine, retrieve sensitive data from internal configuration interfaces, or interact with cloud-native environment variables exposed via instance metadata services. The lack of strict origin validation for these fetch operations allows the IDE to act as a proxy for malicious payloads. Post-exploitation, the attacker gains the ability to map the internal network topology or exfiltrate environment-specific information, significantly increasing the risk of subsequent lateral movement or information disclosure within the developer's organization."
}