Description

WWBN AVideo generates passwords for external-login accounts using rand() instead of a cryptographic generator, producing only 31-bit integers. Attackers with access to password hashes can recover plaintext passwords in minutes through offline brute-force attacks due to unsalted MD5-based hashing.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.9",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-05T13:18:13.703Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-05T13:18:13.703Z",
  "executiveSummary": "WWBN AVideo exhibits a critical vulnerability in its external-login account password generation mechanism. The application utilizes the insecure rand() function rather than a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG), resulting in a severely restricted entropy space of only 31 bits.\nFurthermore, the implementation relies on unsalted MD5 hashing for stored passwords, which is cryptographically insufficient for modern security standards. This combination of weak randomness and obsolete hashing algorithms exposes the system to high-risk offline brute-force attacks.\nAn attacker who gains read access to the password hash database can recover plaintext credentials in a matter of minutes. The impact is significant, as it facilitates unauthorized account takeovers, potentially granting attackers administrative access to the AVideo platform. Exploitation does not require network interaction, as the attack vector relies on the compromise of the data storage layer. The vulnerability represents a failure in secure random number generation and credential storage practices.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the implementation of the password generation logic within the WWBN AVideo framework. The application relies on the standard PHP rand() function to generate passwords for external-login accounts. The rand() function is not cryptographically secure and, in many environments, is limited by a maximum value resulting in a 31-bit integer space. This limitation drastically reduces the total number of possible combinations, rendering the generated passwords susceptible to rapid pre-computation or brute-force analysis.\nThe attack flow begins with the unauthorized acquisition of the user authentication table, typically via SQL injection or unauthorized access to backup files. Upon accessing the database, an attacker identifies the MD5-hashed values associated with these external-login accounts. Because MD5 is a fast, legacy hashing algorithm and lacks the implementation of a unique salt, it is highly susceptible to high-speed dictionary attacks and rainbow table lookups.\nThe exploitation process follows these steps: First, the attacker identifies the subset of user accounts created via the external-login feature. Second, the attacker leverages the known weakness in the 31-bit randomness to narrow the search space of possible candidate passwords significantly. Third, utilizing high-performance computing resources or GPU-accelerated cracking tools, the attacker executes an offline brute-force attack against the MD5 hashes. Given the small entropy (2^31 possible values), the cracking process can be completed in minutes.\nThe lack of cryptographic salting ensures that identical passwords for different users result in identical hash values, facilitating batch cracking. Once the plaintext passwords are recovered, the attacker can authenticate as the victim, bypass multi-factor authentication (if not independently enforced), and elevate privileges within the AVideo environment. The vulnerability is systemic to the application's account provisioning logic and poses a severe threat to the confidentiality and integrity of user credentials stored within the application's backend architecture."
}