Description

SQL Chat contains four unauthenticated API endpoints that accept client-supplied database connection parameters and execute arbitrary SQL queries against attacker-specified hosts. Attackers can connect to internal databases, execute SQL commands, enumerate schemas, and pivot into the server's network without authentication.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.7",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-05T10:16:43.750Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-05T10:16:43.750Z",
  "executiveSummary": "SQL Chat is affected by a critical vulnerability involving four unauthenticated API endpoints that permit arbitrary database connection and query execution.\nThe vulnerability allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to supply arbitrary database connection parameters, effectively bypassing intended access controls.\nThis flaw enables attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands against attacker-specified hosts, leading to unauthorized data access, database manipulation, and network pivoting.\nThe risk is severe as it provides a pathway for an attacker to interact with internal, non-publicized databases by leveraging the SQL Chat server as a proxy.\nNo authentication or specific privileges are required to exploit this flaw, making it accessible to any attacker capable of reaching the vulnerable API endpoints over the network.\nSuccessful exploitation results in full compromise of the backend database connectivity, allowing for extensive schema enumeration and potentially escalating into deeper network penetration.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the backend API layer of SQL Chat, which exposes four distinct endpoints lacking authentication checks for database connection requests. These endpoints are designed to facilitate database interaction but fail to sanitize or validate client-supplied connection strings and host parameters.\nThe root cause is a failure to enforce authorization and input validation on server-side database drivers initiated via API requests. Instead of restricting connections to a predefined, secure list of databases, the application allows the client to define the target host, port, credentials, and connection protocol.\nThe attack flow follows a sequential process: First, an attacker identifies the vulnerable API endpoints through traffic analysis. Second, the attacker crafts a malicious request containing connection parameters pointing to an attacker-controlled listener or an internal, restricted database endpoint. Third, the SQL Chat server receives the request and, lacking authentication, initializes a database connection to the target specified by the attacker.\nOnce the connection is established, the attacker sends subsequent requests to execute arbitrary SQL queries through the established session. This allows for the enumeration of database schemas, table extraction, and data modification. Furthermore, because the SQL Chat instance performs the connection on behalf of the attacker, it acts as a pivot point, granting the attacker access to network segments that would otherwise be unreachable from an external IP address.\nThe impact is significant: the ability to execute arbitrary SQL enables full CRUD (Create, Read, Update, Delete) operations on the target database, potential remote code execution via database-specific features (such as xp_cmdshell in MSSQL), and the ability to exfiltrate sensitive data. By using the vulnerable API as an internal bridge, the attacker bypasses network-level firewalls and security groups that might otherwise restrict unauthorized database access."
}