Description

QAnything 2.0.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the /api/local_doc_qa/get_file_base64 and /api/local_doc_qa/get_doc endpoints that allows unauthenticated attackers to access any uploaded file or document. Attackers can enumerate file identifiers through unauthenticated endpoints and retrieve base64-encoded files or parsed document chunks without ownership verification to disclose cross-tenant knowledge base content.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-04T15:17:45.150Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-04T15:17:45.150Z",
  "executiveSummary": "QAnything version 2.0.0 is susceptible to an authentication bypass vulnerability affecting critical document retrieval endpoints. This security flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to access sensitive files and documents hosted within the system's knowledge base. By exploiting the lack of ownership verification in the /api/local_doc_qa/get_file_base64 and /api/local_doc_qa/get_doc API endpoints, unauthorized parties can exfiltrate proprietary or cross-tenant data. The vulnerability poses a significant risk to data confidentiality, as it facilitates the unauthorized disclosure of uploaded content without requiring valid user credentials or session tokens. Attackers are capable of enumerating file identifiers to systematically extract information, potentially leading to full-scale data leakage of all stored documents.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the application's API layer, specifically at the /api/local_doc_qa/get_file_base64 and /api/local_doc_qa/get_doc endpoints. The root cause of this security failure is the absence of authorization checks and identity validation logic prior to processing data retrieval requests. While the application is designed to support multi-tenant or multi-user knowledge base environments, these specific endpoints fail to implement mandatory server-side checks to verify if the requester has legitimate ownership or authorized access to the requested resource identifier.\nThe attack flow begins with an unauthenticated actor performing reconnaissance to identify valid file identifiers, which are often predictable or discoverable via auxiliary enumeration endpoints. Once an identifier is obtained, the attacker transmits a crafted GET or POST request to the vulnerable endpoints. Because the backend logic lacks session validation or authorization middleware for these function calls, the application assumes the request is valid and proceeds to fetch the requested resource from the storage layer.\nIn the case of /api/local_doc_qa/get_file_base64, the system retrieves the file and returns it as a base64-encoded string directly in the HTTP response body. For /api/local_doc_qa/get_doc, the application performs document chunk retrieval and parsing, serving the extracted content back to the client. This bypass effectively ignores the security boundary between different users or organizational tenants. The lack of privilege requirements means that any network-adjacent or remote attacker can interact with these endpoints without interacting with the authentication service.\nThe impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it enables an automated exfiltration process. By iterating through suspected document IDs, an attacker can reconstruct the entire knowledge base content stored in the system. The exposure of sensitive documents, ranging from internal technical manuals to private proprietary data, can have significant organizational consequences, particularly in deployments where multiple users rely on the isolation of their respective document silos. The flaw fundamentally undermines the trust model of the QAnything platform by allowing external parties to bypass the primary access control mechanism."
}