Description

MOOS essential-moos pAntler through 10.0.1 contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary programs by publishing a crafted MISSION_FILE message to the MOOSDB. Attackers can publish a mission file containing malicious Run entries that pAntler parses and executes via execvp() without authentication validation.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.1",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-03T23:17:21.627Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-03T23:17:21.627Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The pAntler component within the MOOS essential-moos framework, specifically versions 10.0.1 and earlier, is susceptible to a critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability. This flaw arises from the insecure processing of MISSION_FILE messages received via the MOOSDB communication middleware.\nAn unauthenticated attacker positioned on the network can transmit a specially crafted MISSION_FILE message containing malicious Run entries. Because pAntler lacks sufficient authentication validation mechanisms when parsing these instructions, it inadvertently processes and executes arbitrary commands defined within the payload via system-level execution functions.\nThe impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it facilitates unauthorized remote command execution, potentially granting an attacker full control over the host system running pAntler. This risk is exacerbated by the lack of internal authentication requirements within the MOOS messaging protocol, allowing any entity with network access to the MOOSDB to trigger the malicious parsing logic. Organizations utilizing MOOS in exposed or untrusted network environments face a high risk of compromise, as no privilege escalation is required beyond the ability to publish messages to the MOOSDB.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the pAntler utility, which is responsible for spawning processes based on mission configuration files within the MOOS (Mission Oriented Operating Suite) ecosystem. The root cause is a lack of input validation and authentication checks during the message ingestion phase of the MOOSDB interaction.\nIn the standard MOOS operational architecture, pAntler listens for configuration updates via the MOOSDB. The vulnerability is triggered when an attacker injects a malicious MISSION_FILE message into the MOOSDB. Because the underlying protocol does not verify the origin or integrity of the message, pAntler accepts the payload as a legitimate configuration update.\nThe exploitation flow proceeds as follows: 1) The attacker gains network connectivity to the MOOSDB instance. 2) The attacker crafts a MISSION_FILE message payload containing specifically formatted Run entries. These entries are designed to inject arbitrary executable paths or command-line arguments into the configuration structure. 3) The attacker publishes this crafted message to the MOOSDB. 4) pAntler, acting as a subscriber, receives the message and proceeds to parse the Run entries. 5) The application passes the unsanitized contents of these entries directly to the execvp() function. 6) The operating system executes the attacker-supplied binary or command with the privileges of the pAntler process.\nThe reliance on execvp() is critical, as it bypasses the need for the shell to interpret commands, directly invoking the system call to replace the current process image with the malicious payload. Because the application logic fails to perform any cryptographic validation or access control list (ACL) verification on incoming messages, an unauthenticated attacker can effectively manipulate the application's process lifecycle.\nThe vulnerability affects versions through 10.0.1 of essential-moos. The attack is network-exploitable, requiring only the ability to communicate with the MOOSDB port. There are no authentication requirements for this operation, meaning that any actor capable of reaching the MOOSDB can achieve arbitrary code execution. The post-exploitation impact includes full system compromise, data exfiltration, and persistent access to the mission-critical systems managed by the MOOS framework."
}