Description

MOOS-IvP uMemWatch through 24.8.1 constructs shell commands from attacker-chosen MOOS client names without sanitization. Attackers can inject shell metacharacters into client names to execute arbitrary commands as the uMemWatch process user through unquoted redirection targets in system calls.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-03T23:17:21.487Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-03T23:17:21.487Z",
  "executiveSummary": "MOOS-IvP uMemWatch through version 24.8.1 is susceptible to an OS command injection vulnerability originating from improper input sanitization. The application constructs shell commands using MOOS client names provided by external actors without adequate validation or character filtering. By injecting shell metacharacters into the client name field, an unauthenticated attacker can achieve arbitrary command execution within the security context of the uMemWatch process. This vulnerability poses a critical risk, as it permits unauthorized system-level operations, potential escalation of privileges, and lateral movement within the host environment. Exploitation is straightforward, requiring only the ability to supply a malicious client name to the target process. Organizations utilizing uMemWatch must treat this as a high-priority security issue, as the design flaw allows for direct interaction with the underlying system shell, effectively bypassing expected application-level security controls.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the way uMemWatch handles MOOS client names when interacting with the host operating system. The application utilizes system calls to process or log these client names, incorporating them directly into shell command strings without sanitizing or escaping shell metacharacters such as backticks, semicolons, pipe characters, or redirection operators. The root cause is the reliance on unsanitized user-controlled input in the construction of a command line interpreted by the shell (e.g., /bin/sh or cmd.exe).\nIn a typical attack flow, an attacker registers a malicious MOOS client with a crafted name containing shell injection sequences (e.g., '; rm -rf /;'). When uMemWatch processes this client, the internal logic concatenates the malicious input into an unquoted redirection target or a broader system call structure. Because the input remains unquoted or improperly bounded, the shell interprets the metacharacters as command separators or operators, leading to the execution of the attacker's payload as a sub-process of uMemWatch.\nThis execution happens with the same privileges as the uMemWatch process, meaning if the process is running with elevated or service account permissions, the injected commands will inherit those same rights. Since the input is directly derived from the MOOS client registration process, no specific authentication or previous privilege level is required by the attacker, provided they can interact with the MOOS community where uMemWatch is active. The lack of validation on the length or character set of the client identifier creates a high-fidelity vector for remote code execution.\nPost-exploitation impact includes the ability to perform reconnaissance, exfiltrate sensitive mission data, deploy persistent backdoors, or disrupt the MOOS-IvP framework operations. Because the injection occurs at the shell level, the attacker can leverage standard system utilities to bypass restrictive environment policies, assuming those utilities are available in the system PATH. This class of vulnerability is particularly severe in robotic and autonomous system architectures where command-line logging or monitoring tools like uMemWatch are often granted broader system interaction rights to interface with hardware or telemetry services."
}