Description

Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in PublishPress Permissions <= 4.8.3 versions.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-02T12:17:15.050Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-02T12:17:15.050Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The PublishPress Permissions plugin, in versions up to and including 4.8.3, is susceptible to an Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability. This security flaw allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to access, manipulate, or disclose restricted object data by manipulating resource identifiers within HTTP requests.\nThe vulnerability stems from improper access control checks on sensitive endpoints, failing to verify the authorization of the requesting user before performing operations on specific objects. Because the plugin does not adequately validate user permissions for these resource references, attackers can bypass authentication mechanisms to interact with protected data structures.\nThe impact is significant, as it permits unauthorized access to sensitive application data, potential unauthorized configuration changes, or the exposure of restricted system resources. This vulnerability resides within the plugin's internal request handling mechanisms. Given that no authentication is required to trigger the underlying logic, the risk is elevated, allowing for automated scanning and exploitation by opportunistic threat actors. Organizations utilizing affected versions of PublishPress Permissions are exposed to data leakage and potential integrity loss, necessitating immediate attention to vendor security updates or configuration hardening.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is identified as an Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR), located within the internal routing or object retrieval logic of PublishPress Permissions versions 4.8.3 and below. The root cause is the failure of the application to enforce strict server-side authorization checks on requests targeting specific object IDs. Instead of verifying the session's privilege level or current user context against the requested resource's access control list (ACL), the plugin processes the request based solely on the provided parameter.\nIn a standard execution flow, the application handles requests involving sensitive objects via specific handlers that should perform validation. In the vulnerable versions, these handlers accept user-supplied input—typically via GET or POST parameters containing resource IDs—without validating that the requester has sufficient permissions to access or modify the target entity. This allows an attacker to perform an enumeration of object IDs or directly access known private resources by crafting requests with modified identifiers.\nThe attack flow follows a predictable pattern: 1) The attacker identifies a target endpoint that references internal objects, such as metadata, permission settings, or restricted configuration files. 2) The attacker crafts a request, often omitting authentication headers or using a low-privileged session, targeting these endpoints with modified object identifiers. 3) The backend server receives the request and, due to the missing authorization check, executes the requested action or returns the resource data to the attacker. Because the plugin lacks a comprehensive check of the current user's security posture at the point of access, the system trusts the incoming parameter as implicitly authorized.\nThe exploitability is high because the vulnerability is reachable over the network without requiring any prior authentication. The payload behavior involves the transmission of targeted HTTP requests where the attacker iteratively modifies the object reference parameters. Post-exploitation, an attacker could potentially gain unauthorized access to protected content, modify security permissions to escalate their access levels, or extract configuration data that could lead to further system compromise. The vulnerability affects the core request management logic, meaning that any module or component relying on this flawed validation mechanism inherits the risk, creating an expansive attack surface within the plugin."
}