Description

WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-01T23:17:22.220Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-01T23:17:22.220Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The WWBN AVideo platform exhibits a critical vulnerability in its password recovery mechanism, specifically within the userRecoverPassSave.json.php script.\nThis security flaw is categorized as an improper validation of cryptographic token expiration, which effectively permits the indefinite reuse of password reset tokens.\nThe vulnerability allows an unauthorized actor who has intercepted or obtained a legitimate password recovery token to bypass the time-based constraints intended to secure the recovery flow.\nBy failing to verify the temporal validity of the token, the application enables attackers to perform account takeovers long after the initial reset request was made.\nThe impact is significant, granting an attacker full control over any user account provided they have acquired the reset token.\nThis flaw poses a high risk to organizational data integrity, user privacy, and overall system security, as it negates the fundamental security controls of the password management system.\nExploitation requires no specific authentication, only the possession of a previously generated recovery token, making it a highly dangerous vector for persistent access.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the server-side logic responsible for processing password resets, specifically within userRecoverPassSave.json.php.\nThe root cause is a failure to implement or enforce an expiration timestamp check for the recovery token stored in the backend database or session storage.\nIn a secure implementation, a password reset token should be associated with a creation timestamp; the application logic must compare this timestamp against the current server time and reject the request if the defined TTL (Time-to-Live) has been exceeded.\nIn this instance, the vulnerable component processes the provided token without validating its temporal context. Consequently, any token that has been issued—regardless of its age—remains cryptographically valid for password modification indefinitely.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, an attacker intercepts or gains access to a user-specific password recovery token, typically distributed via email. Second, the attacker interacts with the userRecoverPassSave.json.php endpoint by supplying the target user identifier and the static, expired token along with a new password payload.\nBecause the server code performs a lookup to identify the token but lacks a conditional check for the 'created_at' or 'expires_at' attribute, the server accepts the request as legitimate.\nUpon successful validation of the token format, the application updates the password hash in the database to the attacker's choice, effectively resetting the victim's credentials.\nPost-exploitation, the attacker gains full authentication access to the victim's account, allowing them to manipulate private content, change further account settings, or potentially pivot to administrative functions if the target account possesses elevated privileges.\nThis vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it bypasses the standard defense-in-depth practice of ephemeral token validity, thereby extending the window of opportunity for an attacker from a few minutes or hours to an indefinite timeframe.\nThe lack of token invalidation after initial use or expiration demonstrates a critical oversight in the authentication state machine of the WWBN AVideo application."
}