Description

The BEAR WordPress plugin before 1.2.2 does not verify a CSRF nonce before saving its meta field configuration, allowing an attacker to overwrite that configuration by tricking a logged-in administrator into visiting a crafted page.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "4.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-12T06:16:26.573Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-12T06:16:26.573Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The BEAR WordPress plugin, in versions prior to 1.2.2, contains a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability.\nThis security flaw stems from the failure to validate CSRF nonces during the meta field configuration saving process.\nSuccessful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to force an authenticated administrator to inadvertently execute state-changing actions via a crafted malicious web page.\nBy tricking a logged-in administrator into visiting a malicious URL, an attacker can overwrite the plugin's meta field configuration settings without the administrator's consent.\nThis vulnerability compromises the integrity of the plugin's operational parameters, potentially leading to unauthorized modification of site settings or unintended behavior within the WordPress environment.\nThe risk is categorized as significant because it exploits the trust relationship between the administrator's browser and the WordPress application, bypassing standard access control checks by leveraging the administrator's active session.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from an inadequate security implementation in the plugin's configuration handling routines. Specifically, the function responsible for saving the meta field configuration fails to perform a cryptographically secure token verification, commonly known as a nonce check, which is the standard defense in WordPress against CSRF attacks.\nThe root cause is the absence of a request validation mechanism that ensures the integrity and origin of the incoming POST request. Because the plugin does not verify the presence or validity of a nonce before updating the database, the backend endpoint is essentially exposed to unauthorized modifications initiated from external origins.\nThe exploitation flow is structured as follows: First, the attacker creates a malicious webpage containing a hidden form or a JavaScript snippet that sends a forged POST request to the legitimate BEAR plugin configuration saving endpoint. This request is designed to contain the specific parameters that the attacker wishes to overwrite.\nSecond, the attacker leverages social engineering tactics—such as phishing or embedding the malicious code on a compromised site—to lure an authenticated administrator to the attacker's crafted page. If the administrator is currently logged into the WordPress dashboard, their browser will automatically include their session cookies with the forged request.\nThird, the web server processes the request as a legitimate action originating from the administrator. Since the server lacks a nonce validation step for this specific action, the request is accepted as valid.\nFinally, the plugin overwrites the existing meta field configuration with the malicious values provided by the attacker, effectively modifying the plugin's behavior to suit the attacker's objectives.\nThis attack requires the victim to have administrative privileges and an active session. The impact is primarily focused on the unauthorized manipulation of plugin settings, which could be leveraged to disrupt site functionality, alter how data is processed, or serve as a vector for further administrative manipulation within the WordPress environment. The vulnerability affects all versions of the BEAR plugin strictly before 1.2.2."
}