Description

Improper access control in Azure Logic Apps allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "10.0",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-17T23:18:51.257Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-17T23:18:51.257Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves improper access control within Azure Logic Apps, a cloud-based platform for automating workflows. The flaw permits an unauthorized, network-adjacent attacker to perform unauthorized actions that result in the escalation of privileges.\nThe vulnerability type is classified as an authorization bypass or improper access control mechanism. By exploiting the logic gap in the access validation process, an attacker can transcend their designated security context to gain administrative or elevated operational permissions within the target Logic App environment.\nThe impact is severe, as it compromises the integrity and confidentiality of the automated workflows and the integrated systems managed by Logic Apps. Unauthorized users may gain the ability to manipulate workflow executions, access sensitive data transmitted through connectors, or modify execution triggers.\nThe attack is primarily network-driven, requiring the attacker to have network reachability to the Logic App interface. Successful exploitation does not require prior authentication to the specific Logic App resource, representing a significant security failure in the platform’s boundary protection. Organizations relying on Azure Logic Apps for sensitive business processes are at high risk of data exfiltration or unauthorized system orchestration if this vulnerability is not addressed.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in an insufficient implementation of Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls within the Azure Logic Apps service fabric. Specifically, the service fails to strictly enforce authorization checks when handling incoming requests directed at certain API endpoints or workflow triggers.\nThe exploitation method leverages the lack of server-side validation for request headers or session tokens when interacting with the Logic Apps control plane. An attacker can craft malicious HTTP requests that circumvent the intended access control policies, effectively tricking the service into treating an unauthenticated request as a privileged one.\nThe attack flow follows a structured progression: First, the attacker identifies the URI of a target Logic App. Second, they interact with the network-exposed endpoint using crafted payloads that manipulate request parameters or headers, exploiting the flawed access control logic. Because the service incorrectly assumes the incoming traffic originates from a trusted or authorized source, it grants the attacker unauthorized access to underlying workflow definitions and runtime states.\nThe vulnerability resides within the request processing component of the Azure Logic Apps environment. This component is responsible for authenticating and authorizing requests before dispatching them to the execution engine. When the security check is bypassed, the execution engine assumes that all subsequent actions performed by the app are legitimate, allowing the attacker to interact with downstream connectors, modify logic, or exfiltrate configuration parameters that might contain sensitive credentials or service principal tokens.\nExploitation does not necessitate internal network access; the exposure is present over the public network via the Azure service endpoint. The privilege escalation occurs because the attacker moves from an unprivileged, unauthenticated state to a state where they can execute arbitrary operations permitted by the Azure Logic App's managed identity or assigned service principal. This transition effectively maps the attacker's actions to the identity assigned to the Logic App, granting them the same permissions as the application itself across the broader Azure environment. Post-exploitation, the attacker can leverage the increased privileges to move laterally through the Azure ecosystem, potentially accessing connected SQL databases, Key Vault instances, or other cloud resources associated with the hijacked workflow."
}