Description

Missing authorization in Entra ID allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.9",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-08T18:21:04.853Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-08T18:21:04.853Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability pertains to a missing authorization flaw within the Entra ID framework, which enables a locally authorized attacker to perform unauthorized privilege escalation.\nThe security flaw resides in the access control mechanisms governing administrative or elevated operations within the identity management environment.\nBy bypassing established authorization checks, a malicious actor can gain higher-level permissions than originally assigned, potentially leading to unauthorized access to directory objects, configuration changes, or full administrative control.\nThe vulnerability requires the attacker to already possess a baseline level of authenticated access to the network or the specific tenant environment.\nRisk implications are high as the compromise of identity infrastructure typically results in a total loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the affected cloud resources.\nExploitation does not require external user interaction but necessitates a deep understanding of the API or protocol interactions that Entra ID exposes for service management.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from an improper implementation of authorization controls within the Entra ID service architecture. Specifically, the flaw exists where the application or service interface fails to enforce secondary authorization checks on specific API calls or management operations after initial authentication has occurred.\nIn Entra ID, identity and access management operations are governed by role-based access control (RBAC). The root cause is a failure in the server-side validation logic that determines if a session token, already validated for general authentication, possesses the necessary permissions (claims) to execute sensitive administrative actions.\nThe attack flow begins with the adversary establishing a valid session within the targeted Entra ID tenant. Upon gaining access, the attacker identifies a management endpoint that is not sufficiently protected by the authorization layer. The attacker then crafts a request, such as an API call directed at the Entra ID Graph or Microsoft Graph API, attempting to modify directory settings, assign roles, or access privileged user data.\nBecause the server-side logic incorrectly assumes that the presence of a valid session token is equivalent to possessing the authorization to perform the requested operation, the request is processed without verifying the user's specific role assignments or group memberships. This effectively circumvents the Principle of Least Privilege.\nThe exploitation method involves the manipulation of specific request parameters that trigger the vulnerable function. The attacker observes that the system fails to validate the context of the user against the requested resource's security descriptor. By submitting these unauthorized requests, the attacker can promote their own account privileges or create new, highly-privileged service principals.\nPost-exploitation, the attacker maintains a persistent administrative presence within the environment, which can be leveraged to exfiltrate sensitive data, rotate credentials, or deploy further malicious infrastructure within the cloud environment. The impact is categorized as a significant compromise of the identity boundary, potentially allowing the attacker to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirements for administrative tasks if they successfully elevate their own role to include Global Administrator or similar high-privilege positions."
}