Description

ToolJet before v3.16.208 fails to validate organizationId ownership in database write and destroy routes, allowing any builder-role user to create, alter, or drop tables in other organizations' databases. Attackers can exploit missing organization-resolving guards to permanently delete tables, insert arbitrary data, and modify schemas across tenant boundaries on shared instances.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.6",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-31T09:17:07.863Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-31T09:17:07.863Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability is an Improper Authorization flaw, specifically a Broken Access Control (BAC) issue, within the ToolJet platform prior to version 3.16.208. The security defect allows an authenticated user with 'builder' privileges to perform unauthorized write and destructive operations on database tables belonging to other organizations within a multi-tenant environment.\nThe risk implication is critical, as it bypasses tenant isolation boundaries. By manipulating request parameters associated with database routes, an attacker can execute arbitrary DDL (Data Definition Language) and DML (Data Manipulation Language) statements against any organization's database managed by the instance. This results in potential data loss, unauthorized data modification, and total compromise of database integrity across the platform. Exploitation requires valid authentication as a builder-role user, but does not necessitate additional administrative privileges or specific network positioning, making it highly impactful for shared instances hosting multiple tenants.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the insufficient server-side validation of the 'organizationId' parameter during database write and destroy operations. The application architecture fails to implement mandatory organization-resolving guards within the request handling logic for specific database routes. Consequently, when a builder-role user issues a request to create, alter, or drop a database table, the backend services process the action based on the provided parameters without verifying if the requesting user possesses valid ownership or administrative rights over the target organization's database configuration.\nThe exploitation flow begins with the attacker authenticating into the ToolJet instance with a standard builder-level account. By intercepting or manually crafting HTTP requests targeting database-related endpoints, the attacker identifies that the 'organizationId' field is susceptible to manipulation. Instead of restricting the request to the attacker's assigned organization, they substitute the 'organizationId' with the identifier of a victim organization. The application backend, lacking proper authorization checks to validate the user's relationship with the specified 'organizationId', proceeds to execute the database command against the unintended tenant's data source.\nThe attack payload typically involves standard database administration commands sent through the authorized API routes. For instance, an attacker can issue a 'destroy' command to delete critical application tables or an 'insert' command to inject malicious data into another tenant's schema. Since these operations are performed by the application's database service user, the underlying database engine executes the commands with the necessary permissions, bypassing the multi-tenancy layer entirely.\nThis vulnerability affects all ToolJet versions prior to 3.16.208. The attack is restricted to authenticated users with builder-role permissions, but within that scope, the impact is comprehensive. Post-exploitation impact includes permanent data deletion (destructive DDL), unauthorized data exposure or modification via schema manipulation, and complete compromise of tenant data isolation. The vulnerability is effective globally across the platform's infrastructure, provided the instance serves multiple organizations."
}