Description

ToolJet Database versions before v3.16.44 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability in the join_tables endpoint that grants JOIN_TABLES ability to all authenticated users without role or workspace membership validation. Attackers can read arbitrary ToolJet Database tables from any workspace by supplying victim workspace identifiers in the request path while authenticating with their own workspace credentials.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.7",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-31T09:17:07.693Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-31T09:17:07.693Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical privilege escalation and Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) vulnerability exists in ToolJet Database versions prior to v3.16.44.\nThe vulnerability resides within the join_tables endpoint, which fails to enforce strict access control checks regarding workspace membership or user role permissions.\nAny authenticated user, regardless of their workspace assignment or authorization level, can leverage this flaw to perform unauthorized queries against arbitrary database tables across any workspace within the instance.\nThe risk implication is severe, as it facilitates unauthorized cross-tenant data exfiltration, compromising the confidentiality of sensitive information stored within the ToolJet Database architecture.\nSuccessful exploitation requires minimal effort, as an attacker only needs a valid user account within the platform and the ability to specify a target workspace identifier within the HTTP request path.\nThis vulnerability highlights a failure in server-side authorization logic, where the application trusts user-provided identifiers without verifying if the requesting subject holds the appropriate relationship or permissions relative to the target resource.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is localized within the join_tables endpoint of the ToolJet Database component. The primary root cause is an insecure implementation of authorization logic, specifically the absence of identity-to-resource association checks during the processing of requests targeting specific workspace resources.\nIn the affected versions (prior to v3.16.44), the application logic fails to validate that an authenticated session possesses legitimate membership or administrative rights within the workspace specified in the request URI. Consequently, the backend application assumes that any request successfully passing basic authentication is implicitly authorized to perform join operations on any database table indexed by the provided workspace ID.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: 1. An attacker obtains a valid session token through standard authentication mechanisms within their own legitimate workspace. 2. The attacker constructs a crafted HTTP request targeting the join_tables endpoint. 3. The attacker injects a victim's workspace identifier into the URL path, effectively bypassing intended tenant isolation boundaries. 4. The server-side controller, missing necessary access control middleware or attribute-based access control (ABAC) checks, executes the join operation using the attacker's session identity against the arbitrary workspace resource. 5. The application returns the results of the table join query, allowing the attacker to view records, data structures, or sensitive contents belonging to the target workspace that should be inaccessible.\nThe lack of role-based validation ensures that even low-privileged users, such as viewers or restricted users, can potentially escalate their access to sensitive datasets if they can guess or discover valid workspace identifiers. Because the vulnerability involves the application layer's failure to verify resource ownership, the exploitation occurs entirely via legitimate API calls that appear functionally correct to standard monitoring tools unless specific behavioral anomaly detection regarding cross-workspace access is configured.\nThis vulnerability significantly impacts multi-tenant deployments of ToolJet, as it effectively nullifies the logical separation between workspaces. Post-exploitation impact includes unauthorized data exfiltration, exposure of proprietary business logic or PII, and the potential for a complete compromise of data privacy across the entire platform instance. There are no specific complex exploitation requirements beyond basic request crafting, making this a high-impact, low-complexity security flaw."
}