Description

Unauthenticated Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in MapSVG <= 8.15.0 versions.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.4",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-31T21:17:54.197Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-31T21:17:54.197Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the MapSVG plugin for WordPress, affecting all versions up to and including 8.15.0.\nThe vulnerability arises from the application's failure to properly validate user-supplied input before initiating outbound network requests. This allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to force the web server to send arbitrary HTTP requests to unintended destinations.\nThe impact is significant, as successful exploitation enables attackers to interact with internal network resources that are otherwise shielded by firewalls, such as cloud metadata services (e.g., 169.254.169.254), internal administration panels, or other local network services.\nBy leveraging this SSRF, an attacker can bypass access controls, perform reconnaissance on the internal infrastructure, potentially exfiltrate sensitive configuration data, or launch secondary attacks against internal service interfaces.\nThe risk is high due to the lack of authentication required for exploitation, enabling low-complexity attacks that do not require prior knowledge of the target environment.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is localized within the MapSVG component responsible for handling remote resource requests, specifically where user-supplied URLs are processed by the server-side backend without adequate sanitization or an allowlist-based validation mechanism.\nThe root cause is an insecure implementation of a remote resource fetching function that fails to validate the protocol or the host component of a requested URL. Because the plugin processes these requests on behalf of the user, the server acts as a proxy for malicious traffic, effectively bypassing perimeter security.\nThe attack flow begins with an unauthenticated attacker identifying a vulnerable endpoint within the MapSVG plugin that accepts a URL parameter intended to fetch external assets (such as SVG files or external configuration resources).\nAn attacker sends a crafted HTTP request to this endpoint, replacing the legitimate URL with an internal address or a sensitive local loopback address. For example, an attacker might target 'http://localhost:8080' or internal cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/').\nUpon receiving the request, the vulnerable MapSVG code initiates a server-side request to the attacker-supplied URI. The server then processes the response from the targeted resource and potentially reflects part of the output back to the attacker or uses it to influence application logic.\nThis behavior facilitates several post-exploitation scenarios: First, the attacker can perform port scanning on the internal network by measuring response times or observing variations in error messages. Second, if the internal services do not require further authentication, the attacker can interact with and manipulate internal APIs or web interfaces.\nFurthermore, in cloud-hosted environments, this vulnerability is critical as it allows for the potential retrieval of temporary credentials, IAM roles, or sensitive environment configurations stored in the cloud metadata service. Since the vulnerability is unauthenticated, it presents a substantial risk to the confidentiality and integrity of the entire web server infrastructure."
}