Description

SolarView Compact contains an OS command Injection vulnerability in in Schedule Settings. If this vulnerability is exploited, an arbitrary OS command may be executed by an attacker who can log in to the product.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-14T07:17:21.617Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-14T07:17:21.617Z",
  "executiveSummary": "SolarView Compact is susceptible to an OS command injection vulnerability located within its Schedule Settings functionality. This vulnerability allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary operating system commands with the privileges of the underlying application service.\nThe vulnerability resides in the application's failure to properly sanitize user-supplied input before passing it to system-level calls. An attacker possessing valid login credentials can leverage this flaw to gain unauthorized control over the appliance's operating environment.\nThe risk implication is critical, as successful exploitation enables full system compromise, data exfiltration, or the deployment of persistent malicious processes. The primary requirement for exploitation is authenticated access to the management interface, meaning the attack surface is exposed to any user capable of logging into the product's administrative or user panels.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is a classic OS command injection flaw originating from insufficient input validation in the Schedule Settings component of the SolarView Compact web interface. When a user configures scheduling parameters, the application fails to adequately filter or sanitize data fields that are subsequently concatenated into shell commands executed by the server-side backend.\nIn terms of attack flow, the exploitation process begins with an authenticated attacker navigating to the Schedule Settings page. By injecting shell metacharacters—such as semicolons (;), backticks (`), or pipes (|)—into fields expected to contain time, frequency, or task parameters, an attacker can escape the intended command string. Once the input is processed, the backend system executes the injected payload within the context of the application's process owner.\nBecause the underlying operating system executes these commands with elevated privileges, the payload behavior can include, but is not limited to, spawning reverse shells, modifying system configuration files, or accessing restricted databases. The lack of an abstraction layer between user input and system command execution is the primary root cause.\nPost-exploitation impact is severe, as the attacker effectively transitions from a standard authenticated user to an arbitrary command executor on the host system. This allows for horizontal and vertical privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms via cron jobs or startup scripts, and lateral movement within the network segment where the SolarView Compact device resides. Since the management interface is typically accessible over HTTP/HTTPS, the vulnerability can be exploited remotely by any attacker who successfully compromises or gains valid user credentials.\nThis vulnerability highlights a critical breakdown in secure coding practices, specifically regarding the interaction between high-level application logic and low-level system shell operations. Without strict input validation, allow-listing, or the use of safe API alternatives (like execvp instead of system), the appliance remains highly vulnerable to direct system manipulation."
}