Description

Pake before 3.13.1 joins the JavaScript-supplied filename for the download_file Tauri command onto the user's Downloads directory with no sanitization. A filename containing path traversal sequences (for example ../Library/LaunchAgents/com.evil.plist) or an absolute path resolves outside ~/Downloads. The command then fetches attacker-controlled content from the supplied URL (via Rust HTTP, not the browser) and writes it to that path. A script that can invoke the command can overwrite user-writable files and install persistence (macOS LaunchAgents, Linux autostart, Windows Startup), leading to code execution in the user account. All desktop apps generated from an affected Pake tree expose the same command.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-30T13:16:56.923Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-30T13:16:56.923Z",
  "executiveSummary": "Pake versions prior to 3.13.1 are vulnerable to a path traversal vulnerability within the 'download_file' Tauri command. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass intended directory restrictions, enabling the writing of arbitrary files outside the user's Downloads directory. By leveraging this flaw, an attacker can overwrite sensitive files or place malicious executables in system-specific startup folders, such as macOS LaunchAgents, Linux autostart configurations, or Windows Startup directories. Successful exploitation grants the attacker the ability to achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user account. The vulnerability stems from a lack of input sanitization on user-supplied filenames provided via JavaScript. As all desktop applications generated by affected Pake versions inherit this command, the impact is widespread across the ecosystem of apps built with the tool. The attack requires the ability to execute scripts within the application context, but does not necessitate additional authentication or elevated system privileges beyond those held by the application user.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the 'download_file' Tauri command implemented in Pake versions before 3.13.1. The root cause is an improper neutralization of special elements used in a file path, categorized as a path traversal flaw. When the 'download_file' command is invoked, the application accepts a filename and a source URL from the JavaScript context. The Rust-based backend incorrectly joins the user-supplied filename directly to the target directory path (the user's Downloads directory) without performing any validation or sanitization on the input string.\nBecause the application fails to resolve or validate the canonical path, an attacker can provide a filename containing path traversal sequences, such as '../', or supply an absolute path. This forces the file writing operation to resolve to a location outside the intended sandbox of the Downloads folder. The application then fetches attacker-controlled content from a specified URL using its internal Rust-based HTTP client and writes the resulting payload to the attacker-defined destination.\nThe attack flow follows a predictable sequence: First, the attacker identifies an injection vector where they can execute arbitrary JavaScript within the Pake-generated application. Second, the attacker invokes the 'download_file' command, passing a carefully crafted filename that traverses to a sensitive directory and a URL pointing to a malicious payload. Third, the application backend receives these parameters and performs an unvalidated file write to the target location on the host operating system.\nThe impact of this exploitation is severe, as it facilitates unauthorized file modification. On macOS, an attacker could traverse to '~/Library/LaunchAgents/' to plant a '.plist' file, ensuring the malicious payload executes upon the next user login. Similar persistence mechanisms can be exploited on Linux via '~/.config/autostart/' or on Windows by targeting the 'Startup' folder. Since the file is written by the application process, it inherits the permissions of the current user, allowing for code execution that persists across sessions and bypasses standard user-space access controls. No specific authentication is required to trigger the command if the attacker can influence the application's internal JavaScript execution, making this a high-risk vector for any Pake-generated application."
}