Description

rust-iot-platform through commit 5df942ab stores user passwords in cleartext without hashing in the user model. Attackers can read API responses from user retrieval and listing routes to obtain plaintext credentials for all accounts.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-29T14:16:38.347Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-29T14:16:38.347Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The rust-iot-platform, specifically up to commit 5df942ab, exhibits a critical security vulnerability involving the storage of user credentials in cleartext. This failure to implement cryptographic hashing for passwords results in a total compromise of authentication security for all user accounts. The vulnerability is categorized as an insecure storage of sensitive information, exposing credentials directly within the application's user model and subsequent data retrieval routes. The risk implication is catastrophic, as unauthorized actors gaining access to the platform's API or underlying database can perform immediate credential harvesting. There are no significant exploitation requirements beyond the ability to interact with user listing or retrieval endpoints. An attacker with standard read access to these API routes can obtain plaintext passwords, leading to complete account takeover, lateral movement across the IoT ecosystem, and potential persistence within the infrastructure. This oversight violates fundamental security principles regarding data-at-rest protection for sensitive user information.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is the absence of a password hashing mechanism within the rust-iot-platform's data persistence layer. The application's user model is designed to store password strings directly as raw, unencoded data. Because the application logic fails to apply salted cryptographic hashes (such as Argon2, bcrypt, or scrypt) during the user registration or password update process, the database maintains a plaintext representation of all user credentials.\nThe attack flow leverages the platform's existing API architecture. The application exposes specific routes designed for the retrieval and listing of user entities. When an authenticated or, depending on misconfigured authorization controls, an unauthenticated request is sent to these endpoints, the backend application queries the database for user information. Due to the lack of field-level access control or data sanitization, the application serializes the entire user object—including the plaintext password field—directly into the JSON response sent to the client.\nAn attacker can exploit this by monitoring network traffic or proactively querying the user management API endpoints. By submitting an HTTP GET request to the relevant user retrieval or listing routes, the attacker receives a payload containing cleartext credentials. This allows the adversary to bypass authentication mechanisms entirely, as they possess the legitimate keys to access any user account.\nThis vulnerability is present in all versions of the rust-iot-platform through commit 5df942ab. The attack surface is defined by the platform's network-facing API, which serves as a conduit for sensitive data leakage. The post-exploitation impact is severe; by harvesting credentials in plaintext, an attacker can authenticate as any user, including administrative roles, enabling unauthorized control over connected IoT devices, sensitive telemetry data access, and potential remote code execution (RCE) if the platform controls secondary system interfaces. There is no protection provided by the application for data at rest, making the database a high-value target for any breach, as the credentials are immediately usable without additional decryption cycles or computational overhead."
}