Description

A security vulnerability has been detected in macrozheng mall up to 1.0.3. This impacts an unknown function of the file /order/submit of the component Order Submission. The manipulation leads to race condition. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The vendor deleted the GitHub issue for this vulnerability without and explanation.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "4.2",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-29T11:16:47.140Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-29T11:16:47.140Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A race condition vulnerability has been identified in macrozheng mall versions up to 1.0.3, specifically affecting the order submission process.\nThe vulnerability resides within the /order/submit endpoint, where improper synchronization of concurrent requests allows for manipulation of state during the transaction flow.\nThis flaw can be triggered remotely, although the exploitation complexity is considered high and the overall exploitability is rated as difficult.\nIf successfully exploited, a race condition could lead to unauthorized state changes, potential inventory manipulation, or inconsistencies in order processing logic.\nThe vendor has removed the original GitHub issue report without providing further documentation or guidance, leaving users without a direct vendor-supplied patch.\nSecurity teams should treat this as a potential integrity issue and implement compensatory controls at the application or infrastructure layer to prevent concurrent request abuse.\nThe attack requires precise timing to exploit the window between the check and the act (TOCTOU) within the order validation logic.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is a race condition affecting the /order/submit component in macrozheng mall up to version 1.0.3.\nThe root cause of this vulnerability lies in the lack of atomic operations or appropriate concurrency control mechanisms—such as database-level locks, distributed locks (e.g., Redis-based), or optimistic locking—when processing order submissions.\nIn a standard order submission flow, the application typically performs a series of validation checks: verifying the existence of items, checking stock availability, calculating totals, and finally persisting the order record.\nIf these operations are not executed atomically, an attacker can dispatch multiple, near-simultaneous requests to the /order/submit endpoint. Due to the inherent delay between the initial 'check' phase (verifying inventory) and the 'act' phase (writing the order to the database), a race condition is introduced.\nBy manipulating the timing of these concurrent requests, an attacker may be able to bypass business logic constraints, such as ordering more items than are currently in stock or manipulating the final order state before the transaction completes.\nThe attack is performed remotely, meaning no physical access to the server is required. However, the high complexity and difficulty of exploitation stem from the necessity of exact packet arrival timing and potential network latency jitter that could invalidate the race attempt.\nThe exploit flow generally involves: 1) Identification of the order parameters required for the /order/submit payload; 2) Using automated tools to send a burst of concurrent HTTP requests targeting the vulnerable endpoint; 3) Exploiting the window of vulnerability where the application state has not yet been updated by the preceding request in the burst.\nIf the application relies solely on application-memory state rather than persistent, transaction-safe storage, the vulnerability becomes significantly more pronounced under high load or when multiple server nodes (horizontal scaling) are involved.\nSuccessful exploitation potentially results in the circumvention of business rules, leading to data inconsistency. Given the lack of vendor transparency regarding this issue, users must assume the order submission service is not thread-safe and is susceptible to concurrency-based manipulation until proper synchronization logic is implemented."
}