Description

Authorization bypass through User-Controlled key vulnerability in Enocta Educational Technologies Inc. Enocta Platform allows Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers. This issue affects Enocta Platform: through 2026-09-28.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.1",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-28T13:17:22.973Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-28T13:17:22.973Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The Enocta Platform is susceptible to an authorization bypass vulnerability resulting from the improper handling of user-controlled keys. This flaw permits an attacker to leverage trusted identifiers to circumvent established access control mechanisms.\nThe vulnerability type is categorized as an authorization bypass, which compromises the integrity and confidentiality of the platform's authentication and authorization workflows. By manipulating identifiers that the system incorrectly treats as trusted, an unauthorized actor can gain access to restricted functions or data without legitimate credentials or sufficient privileges.\nAll versions of the Enocta Platform up to and including 2026-09-28 are affected. The risk implications are severe, as this vulnerability enables unauthorized lateral movement or elevation of privilege within the educational environment.\nExploitation requires the attacker to identify and modify key-based identifiers that the application processes for authorization decisions. Successful exploitation grants the attacker the ability to act as an authorized user, potentially leading to unauthorized data exposure, modification of educational records, or administrative control over system components depending on the scope of the bypassed access controls.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability lies in a flaw within the Enocta Platform's session management or request handling architecture, where user-supplied input is directly utilized to reconstruct or validate trusted identifiers. The application fails to adequately decouple user-controlled parameters from server-side verification tokens, allowing for the injection or manipulation of identifiers that the backend system trusts implicitly.\nDuring the authorization process, the platform relies on specific identifiers to verify user permissions. Because the application logic permits these identifiers to be influenced or entirely replaced by values provided by the client, the validation mechanism is effectively negated. An attacker can intercept requests and substitute their own identifiers with those corresponding to high-privilege accounts or legitimate, active sessions.\nThe attack flow follows a structured exploitation path: first, the attacker observes the application's communication protocol to identify the specific parameters or headers used as 'trusted identifiers' for authorization. Second, the attacker manipulates these parameters, either by brute-forcing potential identifiers, crafting them via known account patterns, or utilizing intercepted tokens from previous legitimate interactions. Third, the attacker submits the crafted request to the backend. Because the server-side logic trusts these user-controlled inputs during the authentication check, the authorization middleware grants access to the restricted resource.\nThe vulnerable component resides in the application's authentication/authorization middleware, which manages identity state transition. Because this logic is executed before reaching the business logic layer, the entire Enocta Platform is exposed to unauthorized access, regardless of the target resource's intended access level.\nThis vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it bypasses the need for credential knowledge. It does not require a prior authentication sequence if the identifier is sufficient to establish session context. The post-exploitation impact includes unauthorized access to PII, modification of assessment data, and potentially unauthorized access to administrative modules, leading to full system compromise or a significant data breach."
}