Description

Gitingest through 0.3.1 fails to properly validate hostnames in _validate_host, accepting any host with a git., gitlab., or github. prefix regardless of known-hosts list membership. Attackers can submit URLs with attacker-controlled hostnames to trigger outbound connections to arbitrary hosts and disclose GitHub personal access tokens via HTTP basic credentials.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.4",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-28T20:20:20.537Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-28T20:20:20.537Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The Gitingest application, up to and including version 0.3.1, contains a critical input validation vulnerability within its hostname verification logic. The flaw exists in the _validate_host function, which performs insufficient checks on supplied URLs. By prefixing arbitrary hostnames with 'git.', 'gitlab.', or 'github.', an attacker can bypass the intended security controls and force the application to perform unauthorized outbound network requests. This vulnerability facilitates Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), enabling attackers to interact with internal or external infrastructure under the authority of the host server. The primary security impact involves the exfiltration of sensitive information, specifically GitHub personal access tokens transmitted via HTTP basic authentication credentials during the forged requests. This exposure poses a significant risk to the confidentiality of development environments and associated source code repositories, as attackers can abuse these tokens to gain unauthorized access to third-party services. Exploitation does not require authentication to the target application, allowing unauthenticated attackers to leverage the server as a proxy to conduct reconnaissance or credential theft against arbitrary endpoints.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from a flawed implementation of hostname validation in the _validate_host function. The logic employs a primitive prefix-matching mechanism that accepts any URL host provided it starts with 'git.', 'gitlab.', or 'github.'. Because the validation logic fails to verify the remainder of the domain against a strict, predefined allow-list or a known-hosts configuration, it incorrectly validates malicious or attacker-controlled domains as trusted entities.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: An attacker submits a crafted URL containing an attacker-controlled hostname that prepends one of the approved prefixes (e.g., 'github.attacker.com'). The _validate_host function evaluates this string, detects the 'github.' prefix, and erroneously concludes that the host is legitimate. Consequently, the application proceeds to initiate an outbound HTTP request to the attacker-controlled server.\nDuring the initiation of this outbound request, Gitingest includes HTTP basic authentication credentials—specifically GitHub personal access tokens—as part of the request headers. The attacker-controlled server acts as a malicious listener, capturing these incoming headers. Once the credentials are intercepted, the attacker gains the ability to impersonate the Gitingest service or its users, potentially accessing private repositories or sensitive service configurations associated with those tokens.\nThis vulnerability effectively functions as a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vector. Beyond token theft, the flaw allows the host environment to be used as a blind or semi-blind proxy to probe internal network segments, bypass firewall rules that restrict ingress traffic, or interact with local services (e.g., cloud metadata services like 169.254.169.254) if the environment is hosted within a cloud infrastructure. The impact is exacerbated by the fact that the vulnerable component operates with the trust and network identity of the Gitingest server itself, rendering standard network-level security controls ineffective against these forged requests.\nThe scope of this vulnerability includes all Gitingest versions through 0.3.1. The flaw resides in the core network communication logic, specifically where external interactions are initiated. Because there is no validation against the actual resolved IP address or a strict FQDN allow-list, any string matching the prefix criteria bypasses the security layer, regardless of the subsequent domain structure."
}