Description

Komodo through 2.3.2 discloses internal resource identifiers and writes audit entries before performing permission checks in the /execute and /execute/{variant} handlers. Authenticated users can guess resource names to obtain internal identifiers and insert fraudulent audit log entries misrepresenting privileged operations.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.4",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-28T20:20:17.363Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-28T20:20:17.363Z",
  "executiveSummary": "Komodo versions through 2.3.2 are susceptible to an authorization bypass and information disclosure vulnerability stemming from improper input validation and sequencing of security checks. The vulnerability resides within the /execute and /execute/{variant} handlers, where the application processes requests and modifies audit logs prior to verifying user authorization.\nThis flaw allows authenticated attackers to infer and disclose internal resource identifiers by systematically probing the system. Furthermore, the logic error enables the injection of fraudulent audit log entries, permitting malicious actors to obfuscate or misrepresent privileged system operations. The vulnerability represents a significant risk to system integrity and audit accountability, as it undermines the reliability of forensic records and potentially facilitates unauthorized information gathering. Successful exploitation requires an authenticated session, though the attacker does not require elevated privileges to perform the probing or log manipulation. The impact is categorized as a failure in access control enforcement, which can lead to unauthorized data disclosure and the corruption of security telemetry.",
  "technicalDetails": "The core vulnerability is identified as an improper execution order within the request handling lifecycle of the Komodo application. Specifically, the /execute and /execute/{variant} endpoints fail to enforce mandatory authorization checks before performing sensitive operations, including the retrieval of internal resource metadata and the subsequent commit of audit log entries.\nUnder normal conditions, the application should validate the user's privilege level before any interaction with internal resources occurs. However, in the affected versions, the application logic proceeds to process the requested resource and record the transaction in the audit trail prematurely. An attacker can leverage this sequence by sending crafted HTTP requests to these endpoints with guessed resource names. Because the system discloses internal resource identifiers as part of the response or logs these attempts, the attacker can use the application's error messages or subsequent log outputs to perform a discovery phase, mapping the internal structure of the application's resources.\nThe exploitation flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker authenticates as a standard user. Second, the attacker issues repeated requests to /execute or /execute/{variant} using brute-force or inference-based patterns for resource names. Third, the application processes these requests and attempts to log the activity before validating the requester's permissions. Fourth, the application responds with metadata identifying the resource or confirms the operation in the audit logs. Consequently, the attacker obtains sensitive internal identifiers and successfully injects fraudulent entries into the audit log system. This behavior masks the attacker's true activity or creates false evidence of authorized privileged actions, potentially leading to the misattribution of malicious activities or the permanent pollution of forensic datasets. The vulnerability exists because the security boundary is only checked after the application's business logic has already interacted with sensitive components and persistent storage, violating the fundamental principle of 'fail-safe defaults' and 'authorization before processing'."
}