Description

gitoxide before 0.52.1 follows symlinks when reading the worktree .gitmodules file, allowing attackers to inject out-of-repository bytes into submodule metadata. Attackers can create a malicious repository with a symlinked .gitmodules pointing outside the repository tree, causing gitoxide to parse arbitrary external files as submodule configuration and expose attacker-controlled name, path, and url values.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-28T12:16:37.887Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-28T12:16:37.887Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in gitoxide versions prior to 0.52.1, specifically concerning the processing of the .gitmodules configuration file within a repository worktree.\nThe vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass repository boundaries by utilizing a symbolic link for the .gitmodules file that points to an arbitrary location outside the intended repository structure.\nBy successfully tricking the gitoxide parser into treating an external file as a submodule configuration, an attacker can influence the interpretation of submodule metadata, including names, paths, and URLs.\nThis vulnerability poses a significant security risk, as it facilitates the potential injection of attacker-controlled configurations into the gitoxide-based tooling ecosystem.\nExploitation requires the victim to interact with a malicious repository containing the crafted symlink, effectively placing the attacker in a position to influence local configuration state based on arbitrary file contents accessible to the system process.\nThe impact is primarily centered on the potential for unauthorized configuration injection and data exposure through the misuse of submodule metadata parsing mechanisms.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is improper validation of the .gitmodules file path during repository parsing in gitoxide versions before 0.52.1. When gitoxide reads submodule metadata, it fails to sufficiently restrict the file system access when encountering a symbolic link at the location where .gitmodules is expected.\nIn a standard Git environment, the .gitmodules file defines the submodules associated with a repository. Gitoxide, while parsing this file to reconstruct the repository's configuration state, follows the symbolic link if the entry at that location is a symlink rather than a regular file.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker creates a malicious Git repository containing a symbolic link named .gitmodules. This symlink is configured to point to a target file outside the repository's root directory, such as a sensitive configuration file or an attacker-controlled file on the host machine.\nSecond, the victim clones or opens this malicious repository using a gitoxide-based application. When the application attempts to read the submodule configuration, the gitoxide library follows the malicious symlink instead of verifying that the file resides within the legitimate repository worktree.\nThird, the parser reads the content of the external file pointed to by the symlink and attempts to parse it as a valid submodule configuration format. This allows the attacker to inject arbitrary key-value pairs—specifically 'name', 'path', and 'url' values—into the internal metadata structures used by the gitoxide-powered application.\nThe consequence of this behavior is that the application adopts the attacker's defined submodule parameters as if they were legitimate components of the repository. This effectively allows the attacker to control the behavior of the application by forcing it to interact with malicious URLs or misrepresent the repository's file structure. Because this occurs at the library level, any downstream application relying on gitoxide for repository parsing inherits this vulnerability. There is no requirement for authentication or elevated privileges beyond the user's standard permissions, as the exploitation is triggered by the natural processing of the repository metadata by the library."
}