Description

Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in WpEvently <= 5.6.0 versions.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-08T08:17:13.140Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-08T08:17:13.140Z",
  "executiveSummary": "WpEvently versions 5.6.0 and below are susceptible to an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability. This security flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to access, modify, or delete sensitive data by manipulating object references within application requests.\nThe vulnerability stems from inadequate access control validation when handling user-supplied identifiers. By modifying predictable parameters in HTTP requests, an attacker can bypass authorization mechanisms to interact with objects intended for other users or administrative roles.\nThe impact is significant, as it grants unauthorized access to restricted functionality and potentially sensitive event-related data without requiring valid credentials. This poses a severe risk to data confidentiality and integrity, as attackers can perform actions that should be restricted to authenticated or privileged users.\nExploitation does not require prior authentication or high-level privileges, making it accessible to any remote network actor. Organizations utilizing WpEvently should prioritize immediate patching or the implementation of compensating security controls to mitigate potential unauthorized data access or malicious operations.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the core architectural handling of object identifiers within WpEvently. Specifically, the application fails to perform robust server-side authorization checks on requests targeting specific event objects or user-related resources.\nAn IDOR occurs when an application exposes a reference to an internal implementation object—such as a database key, file path, or event ID—without enforcing corresponding access control checks. In WpEvently <= 5.6.0, the backend logic trusts the provided identifier provided by the client-side request. When an attacker modifies these parameters, the system processes the request as if it originated from an authorized session.\nThe attack flow begins with the attacker identifying a predictable URL pattern or API parameter utilized by WpEvently to reference specific event entries. By monitoring traffic, the attacker observes how these IDs are passed in GET or POST requests. Since the application fails to validate whether the current request origin is authorized to interact with the target ID, the attacker can iterate through sequential IDs or inject arbitrary identifiers.\nExploitation steps: 1) The attacker intercepts a legitimate request to the WpEvently endpoint. 2) The attacker identifies the specific parameter responsible for referencing the object (e.g., event_id or similar identifiers). 3) The attacker modifies the parameter value to point to a target object they are not authorized to access. 4) The server processes the request, performs the operation on the specified object, and returns the requested data or confirmation of the action. 5) This allows for the unauthorized retrieval of sensitive information or the performance of unauthorized actions like event deletion or modification.\nThis vulnerability is classified as critical because it resides in the authentication and authorization layer of the plugin. Because the check is missing entirely for unauthenticated requests, there is no requirement for session tokens or valid user roles, enabling remote exploitation over the network. The post-exploitation impact includes the full exposure of event metadata, user attendance logs, or administrative event configurations, which can lead to further systemic compromise of the WordPress installation."
}