Description

openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.9 fail to sanitize recovery-slot metadata in the desktop GUI, allowing attackers to inject control characters and line separators into the irreversible-removal confirmation dialog. Attackers can craft encrypted files with malicious slot identifiers containing bidi overrides or line-separator characters to forge warning text and deceive users during file removal operations.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "3.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-27T17:20:58.110Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-27T17:20:58.110Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical improper input sanitization vulnerability exists in openssl_encrypt versions prior to 1.4.9, specifically within the desktop GUI component. The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject control characters and line separators into the irreversible-removal confirmation dialog.\nBy manipulating recovery-slot metadata within a maliciously crafted encrypted file, an attacker can visually deceive users by altering the content of security warnings.\nThis flaw facilitates social engineering attacks, where a user may be misled into performing destructive actions—such as the permanent deletion of sensitive data—based on forged dialog text.\nThe vulnerability resides within the user-facing interface, affecting any deployment where the desktop GUI processes untrusted encrypted file headers.\nExploitation requires the attacker to successfully distribute a crafted encrypted file and trick the user into attempting to remove or manage that file through the affected GUI. No specialized network access or elevated privileges are required for the initial payload delivery; the attack is materialized upon the user's interaction with the malicious metadata via the GUI.\nThe primary risk implication is the integrity of the user's decision-making process during security-sensitive file management operations, potentially leading to unauthorized data loss.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from a failure in the openssl_encrypt desktop GUI component to properly sanitize and validate recovery-slot metadata extracted from encrypted files during the parsing process. When the GUI displays a confirmation dialog for irreversible file removal, it directly interprets and renders metadata content that has not been subjected to adequate character filtering or encoding.\nSpecifically, the application logic fails to strip or neutralize control characters, line separators, and bidirectional (bidi) override characters embedded within the slot identifiers of the encrypted file headers. This lack of sanitization creates a cross-site scripting-like injection vector within the local desktop interface.\nThe exploitation flow proceeds as follows: First, an attacker crafts an encrypted file containing a malicious slot identifier. This identifier is populated with non-printable control characters, newlines (e.g., \\n, \\r), and bidi control characters (e.g., U+202E). Second, the victim is induced to open or inspect the malicious file using the vulnerable desktop GUI. Third, when the user initiates a removal operation, the GUI invokes the confirmation dialog, pulling the attacker-controlled string into the UI buffer. Fourth, the rendering engine interprets the injected control characters, allowing the attacker to force line breaks that shift the legitimate warning text off-screen or use bidi overrides to swap the display order of text fragments.\nBy shifting the layout, the attacker can effectively 'hide' the true purpose of the removal operation or substitute the context of the warning with deceptive, attacker-defined text. This effectively subverts the user's informed consent by creating a visual environment where the perceived action (e.g., 'cancel removal') might actually correspond to the 'confirm' trigger in the underlying UI logic, or vice versa. The payload behavior is strictly focused on UI manipulation rather than remote code execution; however, the impact is significant as it facilitates the intentional destruction of user-controlled encrypted data.\nThe affected component is the desktop GUI's metadata display handler, which is invoked whenever an encrypted archive or slot is manipulated. Because the vulnerability is situated in the presentation layer of the GUI, it remains persistent as long as the malicious metadata remains associated with the file. There are no authentication requirements for this attack, as the GUI typically handles file metadata before verifying the integrity or origin of the encrypted container, thus exposing the UI parser to unauthenticated, malicious input."
}