Description

In openssl_encrypt (pip package openssl-encrypt) versions <= 1.4.8, the desktop GUI passes the steganography password to the CLI child process on the command line via the --stego-password argument (on both encrypt and decrypt paths) instead of via an environment variable as done for the main password. Any local user can read the steganography password from /proc/<pid>/cmdline for the lifetime of the subprocess. Fixed in 1.4.9.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.2",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-27T17:20:57.957Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-27T17:20:57.957Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The openssl-encrypt Python package contains a security vulnerability where sensitive steganography passwords are improperly handled during process invocation. This issue, identified in versions 1.4.8 and earlier, involves passing credentials as plaintext command-line arguments to child processes.\nThe vulnerability type is categorized as sensitive information exposure via process monitoring. Because the operating system exposes command-line arguments of active processes through the /proc filesystem, any local user with sufficient permissions can view the cleartext password by inspecting the command line of the running subprocess.\nThe impact is significant, as it leads to the compromise of protected steganographic content. The attack requires no specialized privileges, only local access to the host system where the application is executing. By monitoring the process lifecycle, an attacker can extract credentials used for cryptographic operations without requiring elevated user rights.\nThis vulnerability highlights a critical failure in secure credential handling, contrasting with the main password which is correctly passed via environment variables. The risk is high for multi-user environments where local information disclosure is a primary threat vector.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability exists within the openssl_encrypt function of the openssl-encrypt package. The root cause of the exposure is the insecure implementation of inter-process communication between the desktop GUI and the underlying CLI subprocess. Specifically, when the application executes encryption or decryption operations involving steganography, it invokes a child process and transmits the steganography password via the --stego-password command-line flag.\nIn Linux-based environments, the kernel exposes process information via the /proc filesystem. The /proc/<pid>/cmdline file contains the exact command string used to launch a specific process, including all provided flags and arguments. Because the steganography password is appended to this command string, it remains visible in plaintext for the entire duration of the subprocess execution. Any local user on the system can iterate through the /proc directory, identify the relevant process ID (PID), and read the sensitive credentials from the cmdline file.\nThe attack flow follows a predictable sequence: First, an attacker establishes persistence or presence on a local machine where the vulnerable software is installed. Second, the attacker monitors for the execution of the openssl-encrypt GUI application. Third, once the user triggers an encryption or decryption task, the attacker reads the /proc/<pid>/cmdline of the spawned child process to extract the --stego-password value. Because the GUI persists the CLI process, the window of opportunity for this information leakage extends until the process completes its task and terminates.\nThis represents a design inconsistency, as the primary password for the application is handled securely through environment variables—a method that prevents credential leakage into the process command line. The use of command-line arguments for the steganography password bypasses this security boundary, exposing the sensitive material to the host OS process table. Affected versions include all releases up to and including 1.4.8. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to decrypt or manipulate protected steganographic data, undermining the integrity and confidentiality of the entire encryption workflow. No network exposure is required for this attack, as it is strictly limited to local system information disclosure."
}