Description

The Signed Video Framework contained a  buffer overflow issue which could lead the application using this framework to crash. The issue exclusively affects the tools used for the validation of signed content. The AXIS OS device's signed video functionality remains unaffected.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T06:17:17.090Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T06:17:17.090Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The identified vulnerability involves a buffer overflow weakness residing within the Signed Video Framework. This security flaw introduces the potential for an application utilizing the affected framework to experience a catastrophic failure resulting in a complete application crash.\nThe scope of this vulnerability is strictly limited to the external or integrated software utilities specifically designated for the validation of signed digital content. Conversely, the core signed video functionality operating natively on AXIS OS devices remains entirely secure and unaffected by this issue.\nFrom a risk perspective, the vulnerability exposes consuming applications to denial-of-service conditions whenever malformed or maliciously crafted signed video streams are processed by the validation tools. The attack capability relies on supplying inputs that exceed the bounds of allocated memory buffers within the parsing routines.\nNo specific authentication or advanced privilege requirements are detailed in the standard context of input validation failures, but successful exploitation fundamentally requires the targeted validation utility to process untrusted or maliciously manipulated signed video payloads.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability stems from insufficient boundary checks and memory management weaknesses within the Signed Video Framework when processing input data structures. Specifically, the component responsible for parsing and verifying signed content fails to properly validate the length of incoming data before writing it into fixed-size memory buffers.\nThe vulnerable component is explicitly isolated to the tools utilized for the validation of signed content, which process cryptographic signatures and container structures associated with the framework. AXIS OS device-level implementations handling the generation or handling of signed video are architecturally distinct and unaffected.\nThe exploitation method involves an attacker crafting a specialized, malformed signed video payload or validation request designed to overflow the designated memory buffer upon ingestion. When the vulnerable validation tool parses this oversized input, the excess data corrupts adjacent memory regions, overwriting critical control data or execution stacks depending on the memory layout.\nThe step-by-step attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker crafts a malicious input payload containing data that exceeds the memory buffer allocation thresholds defined within the signed content validation routines. Second, the attacker delivers this payload to the target application or tool responsible for validating signed video content. Third, the validation tool attempts to parse the payload without proper length sanitization, triggering the buffer overflow condition. Fourth, the memory corruption leads directly to an unhandled exception or segmentation fault, terminating the process and resulting in an application crash.\nThe post-exploitation impact is presently limited to denial of service through application termination, as the memory corruption manifests primarily as a crash rather than arbitrary remote code execution, based on available telemetry. Network exposure, authentication requirements, and privilege requirements depend entirely on how the vulnerable validation tools are deployed within the broader ecosystem by the host application."
}