Description

The MongoDB Rust Driver does not neutralize special characters in a caller-supplied target identifier before embedding it in the request it sends to the server. An actor able to influence that identifier in an application using the driver may cause write operations to be applied to an unintended target within the same deployment using the application's own credentials. This may result in unauthorized modification of data belonging to another logical boundary enforced by the application.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-27T20:18:51.057Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-27T20:18:51.057Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The MongoDB Rust Driver contains an injection vulnerability arising from the failure to sanitize caller-supplied target identifiers before inclusion in server-bound requests.\nThis flaw allows an attacker capable of influencing the target identifier to redirect write operations to unintended collections or databases within the same MongoDB deployment.\nThe vulnerability effectively breaks logical separation enforced by the application, potentially leading to unauthorized data modification, integrity compromise, or privilege escalation within the context of the application's credentials.\nThe risk is high for applications that allow user-provided input to dictate target parameters without strictly validating the structure and scope of the identifier.\nExploitation requires an attacker to successfully inject malicious sequences into the identifier string that alter the semantic meaning of the resulting database command, bypassing intended application-level access controls.\nThe impact is limited to the scope of the application's own credentials; however, it permits cross-boundary manipulation within the reachable database environment.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is improper neutralization of input within the MongoDB Rust Driver. When the driver constructs command requests for the MongoDB server, it embeds user-provided target identifiers directly into the request structure without adequate escaping or validation. This allows for injection-style attacks where the structure of the resulting BSON command is inadvertently modified.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: An application utilizing the driver accepts an input identifier (e.g., a collection name or namespace) from an external source. If this input is not rigorously validated against an allowlist, an attacker can supply a specially crafted string containing special characters that hold semantic significance to the MongoDB wire protocol or the driver's request builder.\nBy manipulating these characters, an attacker can influence the destination of write operations. For example, if an application intends to write to a 'user_logs' collection, an injected string might terminate or alter the command parameters to target a different collection or database entirely—potentially one housing sensitive configuration data or administrative credentials—provided the underlying MongoDB user identity possesses the necessary permissions to access that target.\nBecause the driver processes these parameters as trusted data, the database server receives a request that reflects the attacker's intent, effectively causing the database to perform a legitimate operation (a write) on an unintended logical target. This constitutes a breakdown in the expected authorization flow, as the application logic assumes it is performing a scoped action that is actually redirected by the driver layer.\nThis vulnerability does not strictly require network-level access beyond the application itself, as the exploit is facilitated through the application's own request pipeline. The privilege requirement is tied to the MongoDB credentials assigned to the application; therefore, the maximum impact of the vulnerability is bounded by the permissions granted to the driver's connection session. An attacker with the ability to influence the identifier effectively bypasses application-level access control checks that verify the destination of operations, as those checks occur before the injection is fully realized by the driver's command builder."
}