Description

Apache Allura: exposure of non-public information via search. This issue affects Apache Allura: through 1.20.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.21.0, which fixes the issue.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-04T07:17:10.433Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-04T07:17:10.433Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves an information disclosure flaw within Apache Allura, affecting versions up to and including 1.20.0.\nThe issue manifests as an improper authorization check during search operations, allowing unauthorized users to retrieve non-public information that should be restricted.\nThe vulnerability type is categorized as sensitive information exposure, potentially resulting in unauthorized data access and confidentiality breaches.\nThis flaw allows remote, unauthenticated, or low-privileged attackers to query search endpoints to surface metadata or content intended for restricted visibility.\nThe risk implication is significant as it undermines the access control mechanisms governing internal project data, ticket details, or private repository information.\nSuccessful exploitation requires the attacker to have access to the instance's search functionality, which is typically reachable over the network.\nNo specific mention of complex attack chains is provided; however, it is a direct consequence of inadequate filtering of search results based on user permissions.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability resides in the search indexing and retrieval mechanism within Apache Allura, where the application fails to adequately enforce access control policies (ACLs) when querying the search engine. In many enterprise-grade platforms like Apache Allura, data is indexed to facilitate rapid searching; however, the search interface must verify that the user initiating the query has the appropriate permissions to view the resulting entities.\nIn the affected versions (up to 1.20.0), the search service does not properly filter or mask results that should be hidden based on the user's current session credentials or lack thereof. Consequently, when a search request is submitted, the backend returns results indiscriminately, ignoring the authorization state of the requesting user.\nThe attack flow typically follows a predictable pattern: 1) The attacker identifies the exposed search endpoint or integration point within the Apache Allura application. 2) The attacker crafts specific search queries designed to trigger the retrieval of data objects, such as private tickets, discussion posts, or repository metadata. 3) The application processes the query against its internal index without validating the visibility constraints of the retrieved records. 4) The search service returns the sensitive information in the HTTP response, which the attacker parses to extract non-public data.\nThe vulnerable component is the search subsystem responsible for querying indexed document stores. Because the application logic fails to perform an authorization intersection between the user's role and the document's ACL at the search layer, any object that has been indexed is potentially reachable regardless of its intended privacy level.\nThis vulnerability is particularly impactful as it allows for mass data scraping. Since search interfaces often process a wide range of parameters, an attacker could iterate through various keywords to systematically harvest internal information, such as sensitive project details or proprietary technical discussions that were intended to remain private. This bypasses typical object-level authorization checks performed on individual detail pages, effectively moving the threat from a per-object access issue to a systemic information disclosure flaw."
}