Description

A remote user validation failure vulnerability exists in HPE Integrated Lights-Out (iLO) 7 firmware.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.0",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-05T15:17:22.290Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-05T15:17:22.290Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical remote user validation failure vulnerability has been identified in HPE Integrated Lights-Out (iLO) 7 firmware. This vulnerability falls under the category of authentication bypass or improper authentication, potentially allowing unauthorized remote actors to circumvent established security controls.\nThe flaw resides within the user validation logic of the iLO 7 management interface. By exploiting this weakness, a remote, unauthenticated attacker could potentially bypass the standard login process, gaining unauthorized access to the management environment. Given that iLO is a baseboard management controller (BMC) with profound control over server hardware, unauthorized access poses a severe risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the host system.\nThe impact is significant, as successful exploitation may grant an attacker elevated privileges, enabling them to manipulate hardware configurations, modify firmware, access sensitive data, or perform remote power management operations. This vulnerability does not inherently require local access, making it highly exploitable over a network if the management interface is exposed. Organizations relying on HPE iLO 7 for remote server management must prioritize defensive measures to mitigate unauthorized access attempts.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability exists within the user validation subsystem of the HPE iLO 7 firmware. The core issue pertains to the improper verification of authentication tokens or session parameters during the remote login sequence. Rather than strictly enforcing a cryptographic or logical challenge-response validation, the firmware exhibits a weakness where the validation routine may return an erroneous 'success' status or fail to properly terminate a session when provided with specifically crafted or malformed input during the authentication handshake.\nThe attack flow initiates with a remote attacker interacting with the iLO 7 web interface or API endpoints (such as those using the Redfish protocol). By systematically probing the authentication service, the attacker identifies inputs that fail to trigger the expected rejection logic. In a successful exploitation scenario, the attacker supplies a crafted payload to the login interface that masks the absence of valid credentials. If the firmware's internal validation function fails to adequately sanitize or verify the authenticity of the session request, it grants the attacker a valid session identifier or bypasses the authentication gate entirely.\nThe vulnerable component is the primary authentication logic within the iLO 7 firmware management stack. This component is typically responsible for validating user credentials against local account databases or external directory services (LDAP/Active Directory). The root cause appears to be a logical flaw in how the validation state machine processes authentication attempts, where the system transitions to an authorized state prematurely. Exploitation does not necessitate authenticated access, meaning the attacker can execute this from any network segment with visibility to the iLO interface.\nOnce the authentication mechanism is bypassed, the attacker achieves the privilege level associated with the manipulated request, which is typically administrative in nature. Post-exploitation, the attacker gains full control over the iLO management environment. This allows for the execution of arbitrary administrative tasks, such as dumping server logs, modifying boot configurations, mounting virtual media, or installing unauthorized firmware updates. Because the iLO controller operates independently of the host OS, these actions remain highly stealthy and can persist even if the primary operating system is reinstalled or the server is rebooted. The exposure of the iLO interface to the public network or untrusted network segments significantly exacerbates the risk, as it provides a direct vector for remote unauthorized access."
}