Description

Dell PowerStore contains a Protection Mechanism Failure vulnerability. An authenticated user with limited privileges could potentially exploit this vulnerability to write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem paths.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-01T13:19:59.457Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-01T13:19:59.457Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves a protection mechanism failure within Dell PowerStore, specifically manifesting as an improper neutralization of special elements used in a filesystem path.\nThe flaw allows an authenticated user with limited privileges to perform unauthorized write operations to arbitrary filesystem paths on the affected device.\nThe primary impact is the potential for an attacker to achieve unauthorized file modification or creation, which may lead to system configuration tampering, sensitive data exposure, or the compromise of integrity within the appliance.\nExploitation requires the attacker to possess valid authentication credentials with low-level access to the management interface.\nThis vulnerability highlights a weakness in input validation or path sanitization controls, posing significant security risks regarding system hardening and privilege escalation potential.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the filesystem interaction layer of the Dell PowerStore management interface, where user-supplied input used to designate file paths is inadequately sanitized.\nThe root cause is identified as a protection mechanism failure, specifically a Path Traversal vulnerability (CWE-22), where the system fails to effectively enforce access controls or validate that the provided file path remains confined within an intended directory structure.\nExploitation is initiated by an authenticated user who is already authorized to interact with specific system services but lacks administrative control. By supplying maliciously crafted path strings—typically utilizing directory traversal sequences such as '../'—the attacker can break out of the designated directory constraint.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: 1) The attacker initiates a write request through the management API or CLI interface that accepts a destination file path as a parameter. 2) Instead of providing a valid local path, the attacker injects traversal sequences designed to escape the application's root directory. 3) The underlying application fails to validate the resulting absolute path, allowing the process to resolve the input to an arbitrary location on the underlying Linux-based filesystem. 4) The application then executes the write operation with the permissions of the management service process, resulting in the creation or modification of files outside the authorized scope.\nBecause the write operation is executed by the service account, the impact is bound by the context of that service. If the service runs with high-level privileges, the attacker could potentially modify system binaries, configuration files, or inject persistent scripts that are executed by the OS or other high-privilege system daemons.\nThis vulnerability necessitates existing authentication, effectively excluding unauthenticated external attackers from direct exploitation. However, it significantly lowers the barrier for a malicious insider or a compromised low-privileged account to escalate their impact within the PowerStore environment.\nThe inability to restrict write access to hardened system directories directly compromises the integrity of the Dell PowerStore appliance, potentially facilitating persistent access or further lateral movement within the storage network infrastructure."
}