Description

An Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability in the SonicWall Network Security Manager (NSM) On-Prem Management interface allows an authenticated attacker with SuperAdmin privileges to inject arbitrary commands that are executed on the underlying host, resulting in remote code execution.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.1",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-04T19:17:27.347Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-04T19:17:27.347Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability is classified as an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (CWE-78), specifically identified as an OS Command Injection flaw within the SonicWall Network Security Manager (NSM) On-Prem management interface.\nThe vulnerability allows an authenticated attacker possessing SuperAdmin privileges to execute arbitrary system-level commands on the underlying host operating system.\nSuccessful exploitation results in Remote Code Execution (RCE), granting the attacker full control over the management appliance.\nThe primary risk implication is a total compromise of the security management infrastructure, potentially leading to unauthorized configuration changes, exfiltration of sensitive network credentials, and lateral movement into the managed environment.\nExploitation requires an existing, authenticated session with SuperAdmin-level permissions, limiting the attack surface to malicious insiders or attackers who have successfully compromised high-privileged administrative credentials.\nThe vulnerability affects the NSM On-Prem appliance interface, where insufficient validation of user-supplied input allows for the escaping of intended command parameters and the injection of malicious shell meta-characters.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper sanitization and filtering of user-supplied data within the SonicWall NSM On-Prem management interface. When the application processes administrative requests, specific input fields fail to adequately neutralize special shell metacharacters before passing them to system-level calls.\nThe vulnerability resides within the management plane's processing logic, which utilizes OS command execution functions to handle backend configuration tasks or system diagnostic requests. By injecting shell control characters—such as semicolons, pipe symbols, or backticks—into an authenticated administrative request, an attacker can terminate the intended command and append arbitrary system commands that the application executes with the privileges of the underlying service account.\nStep-by-step exploitation flow: 1. Authentication: The attacker authenticates to the NSM On-Prem console with SuperAdmin credentials. 2. Request Manipulation: The attacker navigates to an affected management feature that triggers a backend system command. 3. Payload Delivery: During the submission of administrative configuration data, the attacker embeds malicious commands (e.g., using command chaining like '; /bin/bash -c ...') within the input parameters. 4. Execution: The application, failing to sanitize the input, passes the entire string to a system command interpreter (such as /bin/sh or /bin/bash). 5. System Compromise: The underlying OS executes the injected command, allowing the attacker to gain persistent access, exfiltrate system configuration files, or deploy further malicious payloads.\nBecause the execution occurs with SuperAdmin-level context, the impact is comprehensive. The attacker can effectively bypass the intended security constraints of the web management interface to interact directly with the underlying Linux-based kernel or management filesystem. Post-exploitation activities typically include the deployment of reverse shells, modification of system logs to conceal activity, and the exfiltration of stored firewall management keys or appliance credentials. The exposure is limited to the management network, assuming the interface is properly isolated from the public internet; however, any network segment with access to the NSM web interface is a potential vector for this exploit."
}