Description

A vulnerability was determined in jQWidgets up to 24.0.1. This affects the function JQXLite.extend/jqxBaseFramework.extend of the file jqwidgets/jqx-all.js. This manipulation causes improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes. The attack can be initiated remotely. The reported GitHub issue was closed with the label "not planned".

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-24T03:16:40.650Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-24T03:16:40.650Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An improper control of generation of code or object prototype attributes vulnerability, commonly known as Prototype Pollution, has been identified in jQWidgets up to version 24.0.1. This security flaw resides within the JQXLite.extend and jqxBaseFramework.extend functions located in the jqwidgets/jqx-all.js file. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows remote attackers to manipulate object prototype attributes, potentially leading to severe security implications such as denial of service, property injection, or remote code execution depending on the downstream application logic. The risk is elevated due to the remote attack vector, enabling malicious actors to initiate exploitation over a network without requiring prior authentication or privileged access. Although the reported GitHub issue was closed with the label not planned, users and administrators must recognize the inherent risks associated with prototype pollution in client-side and server-side JavaScript execution environments. The vulnerability impacts systems integrating the affected jQWidgets versions, necessitating defensive coding practices and dependency reviews to mitigate potential exploitation risks.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is caused by improper handling of object property assignments within the JQXLite.extend and jqxBaseFramework.extend functions in the jqwidgets/jqx-all.js file of jQWidgets up to version 24.0.1. These utility functions are designed to recursively merge or copy properties from source objects onto destination objects. However, they fail to adequately sanitize or restrict input keys such as __proto__, constructor, and prototype during the extension process.\nThe exploitation method involves an attacker supplying specially crafted JSON payloads or object structures containing malicious keys via remote network vectors. When the vulnerable extend functions process these untrusted payloads, the assignments inadvertently modify the global Object.prototype instead of targeting a safe local object instance.\nThe step-by-step attack flow begins when an attacker identifies an entry point where user-supplied data is passed into the JQXLite.extend or jqxBaseFramework.extend methods. The attacker transmits a crafted payload containing properties designed to traverse or pollute the prototype chain. Upon execution, the functions recursively assign these properties, injecting attributes into the global prototype. Subsequent execution paths within the application that rely on standard object properties may inadvertently reference the polluted prototype attributes.\nThe vulnerable component is explicitly localized to the JQXLite.extend/jqxBaseFramework.extend routines within jqwidgets/jqx-all.js, impacting all versions up to 24.0.1. The vulnerability requires network exposure if the application exposes the vulnerable extension mechanism to untrusted user input. Authentication and privilege requirements depend on the specific application context exposing the vulnerable jQWidgets functionality, but the flaw itself can be leveraged by remote unauthenticated entities if exposed via web interfaces.\nPost-exploitation impact includes the alteration of standard object behavior across the entire JavaScript runtime environment. Depending on how the application consumes objects, this manipulation can result in application logic bypasses, denial of service through property corruption, or escalated exploitation scenarios where injected properties alter security decisions or control flow."
}