Description

Dell Secure Connect Gateway (SCG) Policy Manager, versions prior to 5.34.00.16, contains an Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Denial of service, Information disclosure, and Protection mechanism bypass.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.2",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-09T09:17:08.557Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-09T09:17:08.557Z",
  "executiveSummary": "Dell Secure Connect Gateway (SCG) Policy Manager versions prior to 5.34.00.16 are susceptible to an Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default vulnerability (CWE-1188).\nThis vulnerability originates from improper configuration during the resource initialization phase, which fails to enforce secure defaults or proper access control restrictions for critical system resources.\nA high-privileged attacker with local access to the target host can exploit this flaw to compromise the integrity and availability of the application.\nThe potential impact includes a total Denial of Service (DoS), unauthorized disclosure of sensitive system or configuration information, and a bypass of established security protection mechanisms designed to isolate the Policy Manager.\nThe risk is significant because successful exploitation grants an attacker the ability to circumvent security boundaries, potentially leading to full system compromise or persistence.\nExploitation requires the attacker to have established local access and maintain high-level privileges, limiting the scope to internal actors or compromised administrative sessions.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is categorized as an 'Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default' (CWE-1188). In the context of Dell Secure Connect Gateway (SCG) Policy Manager versions prior to 5.34.00.16, the system fails to verify or secure the environment, permissions, or configuration files during the application's startup and initialization sequence.\nThe root cause lies in the application's failure to apply hardened access control lists (ACLs) or appropriate restricted permission sets to resources or files created during the boot-strapping phase. Because these resources are initialized with default or overly permissive settings, they become accessible to local users who would otherwise be restricted from interacting with the Policy Manager's internal operational data.\nExploitation requires an attacker to already possess high-privileged local access. Once this prerequisite is met, the attacker identifies the insecurely initialized resource. By manipulating these default-accessible objects—which may include configuration files, shared memory segments, or temporary directories—an attacker can inject malicious parameters or intercept sensitive data flows.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker monitors the initialization process of the SCG Policy Manager to identify the specific file paths or shared resources that retain insecure default permissions. Second, the attacker leverages these weaknesses to modify configuration parameters or inject payloads into the application’s environment during runtime initialization. Third, the attacker interacts with these unprotected resources to trigger a failure state or redirect the application logic, thereby bypassing existing security controls.\nThe post-exploitation impact is severe. An attacker can induce a Denial of Service by modifying critical initialization files to force a crash or hang the service. Information disclosure is facilitated because the insecure permissions permit the reading of sensitive credentials or operational metadata that should be restricted to the service account. Furthermore, by overwriting security policy definitions during the initialization process, the attacker can effectively neutralize existing protection mechanisms, resulting in a complete bypass of the security perimeter maintained by the SCG Policy Manager.\nThis vulnerability is strictly local, meaning there is no network vector for exploitation from remote origins unless combined with a separate remote code execution or privilege escalation exploit that provides local shell access."
}